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THE SPENDING POWER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER SEBELIUS
ERIN RYAN*
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that portions of the
Affordable Care Act exceeded federal authority under the
Spending Clause. With that holding, Sebelius became the first
Supreme Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of
Congress on spending-power grounds, rounding out the “New
Federalism” limits on federal power first initiated by the
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s. The new Sebelius doctrine
constrains the federal spending power in contexts involving
changes to ongoing intergovernmental partnerships with very
large federal grants. However, the decision gives little direction
for evaluating when the amount of change or funding reaches
the threshold of spending-power coercion. Sebelius thus leaves
open important unanswered questions about the contours of the
new limit and how it will impact intergovernmental bargaining.
This Article assesses the Sebelius doctrine by testing its
application in a legal realm in which spending-power
bargaining features prominently: federal environmental law.
Methodically applying the new limit to the major environmental
programs of cooperative federalism, the analysis concludes that

* Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School, M.A.,
Wesleyan University, B.A., Harvard University. This Article is based on an issue
brief originally published on October 1, 2013, by the American Constitution
Society, Environmental Law After Sebelius: Will the Court’s New Spending Power
Limits Affect Environmental State-Federal Partnerships?, available at http://www.
acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/environmental-law-after-sebelius-will-thecourt%E2%80%99s-new-spending-power. I am especially grateful to Aubrey
Baldwin, Jeff Powell, Richard Lazarus, Robert Glicksman, Craig Johnston, and
Dipal Shah for their substantive assistance, and to Laura Shoaps, Kimberly
White LaDuca, and Sara Blankenship for their research assistance. I am also
thankful for the thought-provoking comments from participants in Professors
Gillian Metzger and Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s Federalism Workshop at Columbia
Law School, Professor Heather Gerken’s Federalism Workshop at Yale Law
School, and Professor Justin Pidot’s Environmental Law Workshop at the
University of Denver, all of whom generously immersed themselves in draft
versions of the project.

RYAN_FINAL

1004

5/31/2014 2:28 PM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

all should withstand legal challenge—even a potentially
vulnerable provision of the Clean Air Act. The review sheds
light not only on environmental law after Sebelius, but also the
many other realms of American governance that engage
spending-power bargaining, such as public education, civil
rights law, social service programs, and civic infrastructure.
The Article concludes that the impacts of the doctrine will be
most palpable in the dynamics of intergovernmental
bargaining. States will have more leverage when negotiating
design and enforcement terms within spending-power
partnerships. However, the federal government may adapt by
relying on spending-power bargaining less often and with less
at stake, even in contexts where states may prefer spending
partnerships to the alternative.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court ruled in the highly charged
Affordable Care Act case of 2012, National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 the political arena erupted
in debate over the implications for health reform and, more
generally, the reach of federal law. The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) was designed to reduce costs and facilitate access to
health insurance by requiring all individuals to participate in
the insurance pool and by expanding the Medicaid state-federal
insurance partnership. Writing for a fractured plurality, Chief
Justice Roberts upheld the Act’s “individual mandate”—the
famously controversial provision requiring individuals to buy
health insurance or pay a fine—not under Congress’s well-worn
authority to regulate interstate commerce, but under its
sleepier constitutional power to levy taxes.2
Analysts fixated on the decision’s dueling Commerce
Clause theories, but an arguably more important element
involved neither the commerce power nor the tax power
directly, but its flip side: Congress’s authority to spend tax
revenue to advance the general welfare. For even as one
plurality concluded that the Act’s expanded Medicaid program
was itself constitutional, a different plurality held that plans to
condition a state’s continued receipt of Medicaid funds on
assent to the new expansion would exceed federal authority
under the Spending Clause.3 Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that Congress could not require participation in the Medicaid
expansion by states that preferred the existing partnership if
rejecting the expansion would cause those states to lose critical
federal funds they had come to rely on.4 That approach would
amount to unconstitutional coercion, he reasoned, violating the
principles of federalism and exceeding Congress’s authority to
1.
2.
3.
4.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2598–2600.
Id. at 2606–07.
Id.
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negotiate with freely consenting states.5
With that holding, Sebelius became the first Supreme
Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of Congress
on spending-power grounds,6 rounding out the “New
Federalism” limits on federal power first initiated by the
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s.7 Complementing earlier
decisions limiting federal authority under the Commerce
Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,8 Sebelius completes the
New Federalism circle by limiting Congress’s ability to bargain
with the states in policymaking.9
The Court’s attention to the Spending Clause will please
critics who have long argued that the other New Federalism
constraints lack force unless the spending power is also reined
in, because Congress can sidestep the others by securing state
action through a spending-power deal.10 However, the same
critics may be disappointed by the modest impact the doctrine
is likely to have on overall federal lawmaking. This analysis
concludes that while the new rule has the potential to alter
state-federal relations within programs of cooperative
federalism, few existing laws are likely to change (rendering
the Sebelius doctrine perhaps ironically consistent with the
rest of the New Federalism).
The new doctrine constrains the federal spending power in
5. Id.
6. For discussion of the pre-New Deal case that comes closest, see infra note
27 (considering United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936)).
7. During the “New Federalism” revival, the Rehnquist Court issued a series
of federalism decisions that established judicially enforceable limits on powers
constitutionally delegated to the federal government. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 1 & n.2 (2012) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism jurisprudence and listing the standard canon of New Federalism
cases); see also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (noting that Sebelius “presented a prime
opportunity for the Roberts Court to revive the Rehnquist Court’s ‘Federalism
Revolution’”); Pamela S. Karlan, Comment, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (discussing the Roberts and Warren Courts’
contrasting approaches to managing federal power).
8. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 1 & n.2.
9. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07.
10. E.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499–500 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman,
Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1523–26, 1531–32 (2004).
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contexts involving ongoing intergovernmental partnerships
with very large federal grants. Sebelius effectively holds that
Congress may not condition a state’s receipt of certain federal
funds within an entrenched spending-power partnership on
that state’s assent to an independent program—at least when
the funds at stake are so substantial that the threat of losing
them coercively undermines state consent.11 The decision,
however, gives little direction for evaluating when the amount
of funding exceeds the threshold of coercion, or even when
changes to an existing program (like Medicaid) amount to a
new and independent program (as Chief Justice Roberts
characterized the Medicaid expansion).12
Sebelius thus leaves important questions unanswered
regarding the contours of the new spending-power limit and
how it will impact intergovernmental bargaining in areas of
jurisdictional overlap.13 These points of uncertainty will
doubtlessly prompt litigation exploring them in challenges to
other spending power-based programs of cooperative
federalism.14 At the same time, federal lawmakers will likely
adapt to the new constraint by changing the way they structure
state-federal partnerships in areas of federalism-sensitive
governance. They may choose to rely on spending-power
partnerships less often and with less at stake—even in contexts
where the states may prefer spending partnerships to the
alternative.

11. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. The result differs if an independent
source of federal authority exists for requiring state performance. See infra notes
135–36 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Sebelius on conditional
spending programs that also implicate Congress’s regulatory authority under
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra Part II.C and notes 108–
10 (discussing how future courts will interpret the precedent resulting from
Sebelius).
12. Id. at 2605–06 (differentiating the expansion as “a shift in kind, not
merely degree”).
13. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105–80 (discussing jurisdictional overlap) and
271–314 (discussing federalism bargaining). See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing both).
14. In programs of cooperative federalism, the federal and state governments
take responsibility for interlocking elements of an overarching regulatory
partnership. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 92; see also, Gillian E. Metzger,
Comment, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 106 (2012)
(detailing the decades long trend in regulatory governance away from “command
and control” regimes to incentive-based programs that provide states more
flexibility, while acknowledging the desirability of direct federal regulation in
some circumstances).
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This Article assesses the Sebelius doctrine by testing its
application in a legal realm in which spending-power
bargaining features prominently: environmental governance.
Spending partnerships are common among the nation’s major
environmental laws, which often join state and federal
regulators in the management of boundary-crossing
resources—like air, water, and biodiversity—that can only be
protected through coordinated multilevel governance.15 As
regulated entities renew their opposition to longstanding
environmental laws and marshal opposition to new ones, some
may seek opportunities to challenge them under Sebelius.
Indeed, attorneys for the State of Texas have already explored
this possibility in ongoing litigation over new Clean Air Act
requirements.16
The following analysis thus reviews the potential impact of
Sebelius on environmental programs of cooperative federalism.
The inquiry sheds light not only on environmental law after
Sebelius, but also on the many other realms of American
governance that engage spending-power bargaining, such as
public education partnerships, civil rights law, social service
programs, and civic infrastructure.17 Exploring how the
elements of the doctrine intersect with the different varieties of
environmental partnerships provides a useful model for
forecasting how the doctrine will interact with similarly
structured statutes in these other areas of law. In this regard,
the Article seeks not only to better understand what happens
to environmental law after Sebelius, but what happens to
intergovernmental bargaining more generally.18
15. RYAN, supra note 7, at 145–80 (demonstrating intergovernmental
interdependence in environmental law); see also Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 70
(noting the potential impacts of Sebelius on established cooperative-federalism
programs for education, welfare, environmental protection, highway
infrastructure, and others); Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the
New Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 815–16 (2013) (asserting
that both the spending and coercion reasoning in Sebelius could jeopardize a
range of spending-power partnerships and affect federal statutes that
conditionally preempt state law).
16. See Lawrence Hurley, Texas Wastes No Time in Citing Supreme Court
Health Care Ruling in Clean Air Act Litigation, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Aug. 1,
2012), http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/08/01/1 (reporting on the Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA case discussed infra in text accompanying note 222).
17. See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
18. For a fuller discussion of state-federal bargaining in contexts of
jurisdictional overlap, see generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2011); RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–314.
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Part I reviews the role of the spending power in
interjurisdictional governance and the permissible scope of the
state-federal bargaining it enables. Part II explores the new
Sebelius limit, focusing on the operation of its three distinct
elements and the points of uncertainty that remain. Part III
analyzes how the doctrine intersects with federal
environmental law, concluding that most (if not all) statutes
should pass muster. With the possible exception of the Clean
Air Act, which links states’ receipt of federal highway funds
with air-quality management obligations, none of the major
environmental laws appear vulnerable to challenge—and even
the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are likely to
survive Sebelius scrutiny.19 Part IV suggests that although an
environmental Sebelius challenge is unlikely to prevail, the
new doctrine nevertheless has the potential to alter the
substance of cooperative-federalism programs in important
ways.
Indeed, the true impact of the doctrine will not be
measured in litigation outcomes, but in the way it shifts
leverage within intergovernmental bargaining. The doctrine is
designed to empower the states, strengthening their position
against the combined force of federal supremacy and the
formidable power of the federal purse. However, that leverage
is only effective if the federal government remains at the
bargaining table, and if it is able to negotiate with the states
for what they actually want. The doctrine may reduce federal
flexibility within spending-power bargaining and overall
federal reliance on spending partnerships, prompting other
means of federal lawmaking that engage the states less
effectively.20 As states often prefer spending deals to the
alternatives in realms of jurisdictional overlap, it remains
unclear whether the states—and American federalism more
generally—will ultimately benefit.
I.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE SPENDING POWER

This Part sets the stage for analysis of the Sebelius
doctrine by reviewing the role of spending-power bargaining in

19.
20.

See infra Part III.
See infra notes 249–58 and accompanying text.

RYAN_FINAL

1010

5/31/2014 2:28 PM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

American federalism and interjurisdictional governance.21
After introducing the special place of the Spending Clause in
the context of the federally enumerated powers, it reviews the
permissible scope of spending-power bargaining before the new
Sebelius limit.
A. Sebelius and the Spending Clause
In the immediate wake of the Sebelius decision, legal
analysts were most interested in the fact that a majority of the
Court had rejected the government’s view that the ACA was
constitutionally authorized under Congress’s commerce
power.22 Policy analysts were most concerned about the
practical implications of the new commerce power
jurisprudence for other programs of cooperative federalism. But
even setting aside questions about the precedential value of the
Commerce Clause analysis (given that the Chief Justice’s only
supporters wrote in dissent),23 the practical implications for
existing governance are likely to be small, at least in the
foreseeable future. After all, much of the debate over the
individual mandate focused on how unprecedented it was:
despite months of effort, nobody produced a satisfying example
of a similar legislative tool used in previous health,
environmental, or any other kind of federal law.
By contrast, the most immediately consequential portion of
the ruling—and one with far more significance for most
regulatory governance—is the part that focuses on the
Spending Clause,24 in which a plurality of the Court limited the
federal spending power that authorizes Medicaid and so many
other state-federal partnerships.25 Congress regularly offers
funding and other federal resources to persuade the states to
21. For a fuller discussion of interjurisdictional governance, see RYAN, supra
note 7, at 105–07 (describing it as regulating matters that legitimately implicate
both local and national interests or obligations).
22. This was the view taken by the Chief Justice and the four conservative
dissenters in Part III(a). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2591 (2012).
23. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & amend. XVI.
25. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–06 (Part IV(a)).
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engage in regulatory partnerships addressing matters of mixed
state and federal interest. Interjurisdictional governance
frequently takes place within spending power-based programs
of cooperative federalism, ranging from social welfare programs
and public education to national security and the interstate
highway system.26
Sebelius, however, marks the first time the Court has
specifically invalidated a congressional act for exceeding its
power under the Spending Clause,27 and it has important
implications for the way state-federal regulatory partnerships
work.
Spending-power partnerships reflect the complex way that
the Constitution structures federal power through both specific
and open-ended delegations of authority. Specifically
enumerated congressional powers include the authority to coin
money, establish post offices, and declare war.28 More openended grants of federal authority are conferred by the
Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses,29
jointly accounting for vast areas of congressional lawmaking.
Policymaking realms that are not expressly or implicitly
covered by delegations to the federal government are
committed to state jurisdiction.30
The Spending Clause bridges realms of federal and state
authority, authorizing Congress to spend money in pursuit of

26. E.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–72, 288–90.
27. Earlier last century, the Supreme Court did something similar in United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which invalidated the 1933 Agricultural
Adjustment Act for exceeding Congress’s authority by impermissibly conditioning
federal farm subsidies on farmers’ agreement to reduce production of specified
crops. Parts of that holding have been obviated by the Court’s evolving view of the
Commerce Clause. For further discussion of the case, see infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, 7, & 11.
29. See id. § 8, cl. 1, cl. 3, cl. 18. To be sure, the Commerce Clause is more
“specific” in nature than the others (given that it confers federal authority only in
relation to matters of interstate commerce), but the breadth of authority it creates
is open-ended in comparison to the narrower zones of federal authority created by
even more specific grants (e.g., for coining money and establishing post offices).
30. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X. There is considerable overlap
between state and federal jurisdiction, jointly governed by federal restraint and
federal supremacy, but that’s another story—and a previous American
Constitution Society essay. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Erin Ryan,
Health Care Reform and Federalism’s Tug of War Within, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG
(June 21, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/health-care-reform-and-federalism%
E2%80%99s-tug-of-war-within; see also RYAN, supra note 7.
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the public welfare.31 Congress can fund federal programs
advancing specific federal responsibilities, such as post offices
or Naval training, and it can also fund state programs
operating beyond Congress’s specifically delegated powers,
such as those addressing public education or domestic violence.
Congress can fund state programs directly, but it can also offer
money conditionally—for example, to any state willing to adopt
a rule or program that Congress would like to see
implemented.32 In these examples, Congress is effectively
offering the states a deal: “[H]ere is some money, but for use
only within this program that we think you should operate” (for
example, providing health insurance for poor children).33
B. The Permissible Scope of Spending-Power Bargaining
In this way, the spending power enables Congress to
bargain with states for access to policymaking arenas that are
beyond the reach of its other enumerated powers.34 Congress
cannot just compel the states to enact its preferred policies in
realms that exceed its specifically enumerated powers.35 Yet
spending-power partnerships are premised on negotiation
rather than compulsion, because states remain free to accept or
reject the federally proffered deal.36 In other words, if a state
doesn’t like the attached strings, it doesn’t have to take the
money. The Sebelius decision likens the spending-power deal to
a contract, valid when “the State voluntarily and knowingly

31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
32. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (“Incident to this
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has
repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory
and administrative directives.’”).
33. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa–mm (1997).
34. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–07 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (“[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s
‘enumerated legislative fields,’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”).
35. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the
Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from “commandeering” state participation as
part of a federal regulatory program).
36. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–91 (1937) (rejecting the
argument that economic incentives are coercive because would-be recipients
retain “the freedom of the will” to decline).
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accepts the terms.”37
Members of the Court have sporadically worried about
circumstances that might undermine the voluntariness of state
consent in spending-power bargaining, but usually in dicta and
without much elaboration.38 For example, in Steward Machine
Company v. Davis, the Court considered whether the Social
Security Act of 1935 encroached on constitutionally reserved
state authority by creating a coercive structure of federal
taxation.39 The Court briefly considered the argument that
federal economic pressure could compel the states, but it firmly
rejected the idea, concluding that “to hold that motive or
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into
endless difficulties.”40
Steward Machine appeared to resolve questions about the
permissible scope of spending-power bargaining that the Court
had left open one year earlier in United States v. Butler, in
which it invalidated the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act on
grounds reminiscent of the concerns raised in Sebelius.41 In a
holding discredited by subsequent developments in
constitutional law, the Court invalidated conditional farm
subsidies and processing taxes for exceeding federal authority
by coercing individual farmers into reduced agricultural
production.42 The Court affirmed that the taxing and spending
powers are not limited by the scope of Congress’s other
enumerated powers,43 but concluded that Congress had
nevertheless wielded them here for the unconstitutional ends of

37. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012).
38. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590 (worrying about “the point at
which pressure turns into compulsion”); Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing the scant
discussion of this point in Steward Machine); cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 74 (1936) (discussed infra, note 41).
39. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 548.
40. Id. at 589–91. The Court also distinguished United States v. Butler,
finding that the specific points of weakness identified in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act did not apply to the Social Security Act. Id. at 592.
41. 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936).
42. Butler, 297 U.S. at 74. The Court concluded that Congress lacked
authority to regulate agricultural production, and that it could not skirt the
bounds of federal authority by deploying particularized taxes on individual
farmers this way. Id. (“Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the
farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that
it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase
compliance.”).
43. Id. at 65–66.
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invading the residual authority preserved to the states.44
Butler turned on the limits of Congress’s ability to
influence individuals’ choices through conditional taxes, rather
than its ability to influence state choices through conditional
spending (the primary factor in the Sebelius spending-power
analysis). However, it confronted the analogous concern that
Congress had exceeded constitutional reach by coercing noncooperators into a federally desired course of action by the use
of economic incentives. Butler is an especially poignant
historical counterpart to Sebelius given the available parallels
between the farm taxes and subsidies there invalidated, and
the individual mandate at issue in the larger ACA controversy.
Today, Butler leaves an interesting legacy for Sebelius
interpreters. The Court’s confirmation that the spending power
operates independently from the other federally enumerated
powers set the stage for the modern breadth of the doctrine.
However, other parts of its holding have been obviated by the
Court’s evolving view of federal authority under both the
Commerce45 and the Spending Clauses.46 The conservative
dissenters in Sebelius echo Butler’s concern that the spending
power not be used to obliterate the constitutional system of
enumerated powers.47 Yet the intervening seventy-five years of
precedent starkly rejects Butler’s view that spending-power
bargaining cannot intrude into areas of reserved state power,
such as public education, health, or safety.48
The culmination of that line of precedent is the Court’s
1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole, in which it broadly
upheld the spending bargaining enterprise in a case
challenging a federal law that conditioned 5 percent of a state’s
federal highway funds on its adoption of the national drinking
age.49 Writing for a majority of seven, Chief Justice Rehnquist
44. Id. at 74–75; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (describing the
invalidated tax as a punitive exaction designed to regulate behavior beyond what
was then considered legitimate federal reach).
45. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (affirming that the
Commerce Clause confers federal authority that would have justified the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(same).
46. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987) (affirming
that the Tenth Amendment is not an independent constitutional bar to spending
power bargaining beyond the reach of Congress’s other enumerated powers).
47. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2657 (Scalia, J. et al, dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11.
49. Id. at 206–12 (upholding the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which
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concluded that neither the Tenth nor the Twenty-first
Amendments undermined the constitutionality of the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act, even though Congress could not
regulate underage alcohol consumption directly.50 In so doing,
he formally parted ways with all vestiges of the Butler
analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also found the deal consistent with
all other previously recognized constraints on conditional
federal spending,51 including the requirement recently clarified
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman52 that
Congress unambiguously informs the states what would be
expected of them in exchange for the conditioned funds.53 And
though the clearly stated obligation to adopt the national
drinking age was not a direct use of the conditioned highway
funds, the connection between a uniform national drinking age
and highway safety was sufficiently germane to satisfy the
Chief Justice’s scrutiny.54 As he explained, federal highway
funds are provided to enhance safe interstate travel, and
highway accidents involving underage drinkers posed a major
threat to road safety.55
In cataloguing the history of supportive spending-power
precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the scope of
congressional authority to bargain with the states pursuant to
the Spending Clause:
The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is
instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in
our cases. The first of these limitations is derived from the
language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the

established twenty-one years as the minimum legal age of public alcohol
consumption).
50. Id. at 206–11.
51. Id. at 206–08.
52. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1980) (holding conditional funds for care for the
developmentally disabled unsupported by the Spending Clause because Congress
had failed to provide clear notice of the obligations that would be required of
recipient states).
53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
54. Id. at 208–09.
55. Id. (“A Presidential commission appointed to study alcohol-related
accidents and fatalities on the Nation’s highways concluded that the lack of
uniformity in the States’ drinking ages created ‘an incentive to drink and drive’
because ‘young persons commut[e] to border States where the drinking age is
lower.’”).
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spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.”
In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
substantially to the judgment of Congress. Second, we have
required that, if Congress desires to condition the States’
receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . .
enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Third,
our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration)
that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if
they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.”56

After finding the grant consistent with each of these
requirements, Chief Justice Rehnquist dispensed with South
Dakota’s final argument that the grant nevertheless coerced
the states through the attractive force of much-needed federal
funds.57 Quoting language made famous in Steward Machine,
he concluded that the economic incentives created by
conditional grants do not unconstitutionally coerce the states
because they continue to exercise free will in making the best
choices for themselves:
Every [economic incentive] conditioned upon conduct is in
some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the
acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice
becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will
as a working hypothesis in the solution of its problems. 58

Characterizing the federal grant at issue as “relatively
mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum
drinking ages than they would otherwise choose,” he pointed
out that “the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative
of the States not merely in theory but in fact.”59
56. Id. at 207 (internal citations omitted).
57. Id. at 208–09.
58. Id. at 211–12 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–91
(1937)).
59. Id. at 211–12.
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Dole thus affirmed that spending-power deals are
constitutional so long as the conditions (1) promote the general
welfare, (2) are unambiguous, (3) are reasonably related
(“germane”) to the federal interest, and (4) do not induce
independent constitutional violations.60 No law has ever run
afoul of Dole’s broad limits,61 which have not since been
revisited—until now.
II. THE NEW SEBELIUS SPENDING-POWER LIMIT
This Part explores the Sebelius doctrine and how it alters
the permissible scope of state-federal bargaining under the
Spending Clause. After reviewing the Court’s disposition of the
spending-power claim in the case, it isolates the primary
elements of the new doctrine and the multiple points of
uncertainty it leaves for future interpreters, closing with a
critique.
A. The Sebelius Spending-Power Holding
In challenging the ACA, twenty-six states argued that
Congress had overstepped its bounds by effectively forcing
them to accept a significant expansion of Medicaid, the stateadministered but mostly federally funded public health
insurance program.62 Before the ACA, Medicaid required that
participating states offer health insurance to discrete
categories of vulnerable people, including pregnant women,
children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled.63 The ACA amendments required states to extend
insurance to the general population of people under age sixtyfive with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty
line.64
All states currently participate in the Medicaid
partnership, but those that did not extend insurance to the
larger population anticipated by the ACA would be out of
60. Id. at 206.
61. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003)
(rejecting a challenge prompting the Court to revisit the Dole spending power
limits in a case about highway funding that was ultimately upheld under
Congress’s commerce power).
62. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580, 2601.
63. Id. at 2601.
64. Id.
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compliance with the new terms of the program. A longstanding
provision specifies that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services may withhold all Medicaid funds to any state failing to
comply with any Medicaid requirement.65 The plaintiff states
feared losing that substantial source of funding—on average,
about 10 percent of their annual budgets—if they rejected the
ACA expansion.66
Reflecting the Court’s previous emphasis on the states’ free
will in spending-power bargaining,67 the federal government
defended the conditioned Medicaid funds as a conditional gift
that states remain free to take or refuse as best serves their
interests.68 Congress even had included a provision in the
original Medicaid legislation expressly stating that it could
modify the program from one year to the next, so the defendant
agency argued that the states had always been on notice that
the terms of the ongoing spending-power deal would change
from time to time.69 In fact, Congress had previously modified
Medicaid nearly fifty times since its inception,70 suggesting
that the additional changes here were unremarkable in the
context of the full Medicaid partnership.
The plaintiff states maintained that the ACA expansion
was different, however, because the changes were much more
serious, and because they could not now disentangle from this
critical social service program on which their citizens had come
to rely.71 They argued that conditioning their continued access
to needed Medicaid funds on their assent to the new expansion
would be unconstitutionally coercive, because they could not
realistically refuse if it meant losing 10 percent of their annual
budget.72 This was not the “relatively mild” economic incentive
upheld in Dole, they argued, and though they may have been
free to reject the Medicaid expansion in theory, they were not

65. Id. at 2607.
66. See id. at 2582, 2605.
67. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
68. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06.
69. Id. at 2605, 2631. The Social Security Act, which includes Medicaid,
includes a clause expressly reserving “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision” of that statute. Id. at 2605 (quoting Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1304 (1935)).
70. Id. at 2630–31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing this provision and the
fifty amendments that have been made to Medicaid since 1965).
71. See id. at 2603–05.
72. See id. at 2603, 2605.
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free to do so in fact.73 They alleged that their consent to the
expansion would be effectively involuntary.74 With no ability to
foresee this substantial change in the direction of Medicaid,
they had become unfairly trapped in dependence on the
existing program.
Holding for the plaintiffs on this point, a strained plurality
of the Court stated a new rule limiting the scope of Congress’s
spending power in the context of an ongoing partnership of
substantial means.75 Joined only by Justices Breyer and
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts began by upholding the
presumption underlying spending-power bargaining—that is,
that it does not coerce the states because they can always walk
away from the bargaining table if they do not like the terms of
the deal.76 As he explained, concerns about federal coercion are
usually dispelled by relying on the states to “just say no” when
they don’t like the proposed federal terms, wryly observing that
“[t]he States are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it.”77 The Medicaid expansion would
therefore be constitutional in isolation because states that did
not want to participate in it could simply choose not to. No
coercion, no constitutional problem.
But then the decision takes a key turn. There would be
unconstitutional coercion, the Chief Justice explained, if
Congress could penalize states opting out of the Medicaid
expansion by cancelling their existing programs.78 The
Medicaid partnership has become so entrenched, he wrote, that
punishing a state’s decision to reject an unforeseeable change
by denying funds for its existing program would leave that
state no genuine opportunity to decline the new deal.79 If it
would be realistically impossible to say “no” to unfairly
conditioned new terms, a state that says “yes” cannot be
73. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at
2604–05 (applying this language from Dole to the facts in Sebelius).
74. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
75. Id. at 2603–06.
76. See id. at 2602–03.
77. Id. at 2603.
78. See id. at 2607. The Chief Justice’s opinion was joined by Justices Breyer
and Kagan. Dissenting Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito completed
the plurality by agreeing that the Medicaid expansion should be invalidated for
exceeding the spending power, but under a different rationale (tying coercion
primarily to the size of the grant). See id. at 2666. Because the Chief Justice’s
rationale is narrower than that of the dissenting justices, his controls.
79. See id. at 2605, 2607.
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considered to consent voluntarily. Any agreement thus
procured is one made coercively, under duress.80
The Chief Justice’s coercive conditions analysis—roughly
holding that Congress may not pressure a state to accept a new
spending-power deal by threatening to terminate independent
grants on which the state already relies81—required two
critical interpretive moves.
First, he had to distinguish Dole. After all, the spending
deal upheld in Dole had also conditioned ongoing funds for one
purpose (highway maintenance) on participation in an
indirectly related program (a national drinking age).82 If
independent conditions like these create constitutional
difficulties, then the entire line of Spending Clause cases
premised on Dole becomes suspect.
To resolve this potential problem, Chief Justice Roberts
distinguished Dole and its progeny on the grounds that the
Medicaid grants at issue in Sebelius were simply so much
larger in size.83 The plaintiff states may have willingly chosen
to participate in the original Medicaid program, but they were
now being “economic[ally] dragoon[ed]” into the expansion by
the threatened loss of so large a percentage of their annual
budgets.84 In contrast to valid spending-power programs that
attract meaningful state consent by offering directly related
federal funds, he concluded that the ACA—coupling an
invitation to the new partnership with the threatened loss of
funding for the old partnership—procured state consent by “a
gun to the head.”85
Second, and equally important, to make the “independent
conditions” part of his analysis work, the Chief Justice had to
construe acceptance of the Medicaid expansion as an
“independent condition,” not one organically related to the use
of the funds at issue. To accomplish this, he characterized
Congress’s new vision of Medicaid as really being two separate
programs: (1) the pre-existing program, requiring health
80. Id. at 2604.
81. Id. at 2603–04.
82. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). The Dole condition
was considered indirectly related because highway maintenance grants are made
to enhance highway safety, and lowering the drinking age would also enhance
highway safety. Id.
83. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2604.
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insurance for discrete categories of vulnerable people; and (2)
the “independent” expansion, requiring insurance for the
general low-income population.86
While a joint dissent by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito tied coercive abuse of the spending power primarily
to the size of the federal grant at issue, the Chief Justice
located coercion in the combined force of the size of the grant
and the conditioning of that grant on assent to the terms of an
unrelated program.87 His opinion thus differentiates between
Congress (a) permissibly encouraging state policy choices by
restricting even a large federal grant to a specified use, and (b)
impermissibly coercing the same policy choice by restricting
receipt of a large grant for an independent use:
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the
receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions
on the use of those funds, because that is the means by
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according
to its view of the “general Welfare.” Conditions that do not
here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be
justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions
take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.88

As for the ACA, coercion was evident because receipt of the
large existing Medicaid grant was made conditional on a state’s
assent to the independent expansion. The Medicaid expansion
was an independent program, he reasoned, because no state
could have foreseen that the original program it accepted would
evolve from one to insure “the neediest among us” to “an
element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal
health insurance coverage.”89 For the Chief Justice, the
universality of the new plan appears to have strained the
trajectory of the original partnership beyond foreseeability by
86. Id. at 2601 (“The current Medicaid program requires states to cover only
certain discrete categories of needy individuals—pregnant women, children, needy
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled.”).
87. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 866–73 (2013) (contrasting the
analyses of the Chief Justice and the joint dissent on this point).
88. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04.
89. Id. at 2606.
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the plaintiff states—justifying its treatment by the Court as an
independent program, despite its characterization by Congress
as an expansion of the existing program.
On this point, the Chief Justice’s analysis appears to draw
on the second criterion of Dole, requiring that federal
conditions be stated unambiguously to the states.90 This
requirement preserves the integrity of state consent in
spending-power bargaining by ensuring that states are fully
enabled to make independent choices in their best interest. The
Sebelius doctrine thus attempts to secure the foundations of
genuine state consent by preventing Congress from
(purposefully or inadvertently) luring a state into dependence
on a spending-power deal that evolves from an unambiguous
beginning into an unforeseeable end.
As Justice Ginsburg suggests in dissent, however, this
primary point of contact between the Chief Justice’s analysis
and the leading spending-power precedent to this point is one
of relatively few such points of contact.91 An even stronger
analysis might have elaborated more fully on how Sebelius
follows from Dole’s other elements, and how the various
constraints should work together going forward.92
B. The Elements of the Sebelius Analysis
The Sebelius analysis thus appears to hinge on three
moving parts, each of which must be manifest before
unconstitutional coercion is found. First, there must be an
ongoing spending-power partnership in which states have
90. Id. at 2634 n.18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting, perhaps disdainfully,
that the relationship between the Chief Justice’s opinion and Dole seems limited
to the fact that he “appears to rely heavily” on the second Dole criterion).
91. Id.
92. Sebelius’s neglect of Dole is surprising, given its central place in Spending
Clause jurisprudence. Then again, Sebelius was a historic decision in which Chief
Justice Roberts was largely viewed as taking either heroic or anti-heroic steps
(depending on one’s point of view) to avoid toppling seventy-five years’ worth of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Roberts Chooses
Restraint Over History on Obamacare, BLOOMBERG VIEW, June 28, 2012,
available at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-06-28/roberts-choosesrestraint-over-history-on-obamacare. He was apparently less uneasy about
unsettling the same period’s accumulation of Spending Clause jurisprudence, but
perhaps his avoidance of deeper engagement with the existing constraints reflect
a related desire to assert this result while leaving as much prior case law intact as
possible. Whatever its origin, the result is that Sebelius lacks a more satisfying
integration with preceding spending power precedent.
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formed reasonable reliance interests—such that later
congressional changes could constitute an unfair surprise to a
state that voluntarily became entrenched under an acceptable
set of rules but must now contend with an unacceptable set.93
Here, the plaintiff states argued that this had been their fate
under Medicaid, which had seemed like a reasonable
partnership in the beginning but became unreasonable after
the ACA amendments.94
Second, the change must condition continued funds within
the entrenched program on assent to terms that do not directly
relate to how those original funds are to be used—for example,
conditioning funds for existing Medicaid populations on
coverage for new populations.95 And finally, the funding at
issue must be so large and the impact of losing it so dire for a
state that its capitulation to the new terms constitutes coerced
assent rather than voluntary agreement.96
Accordingly, and consistent with both new and old
spending-power jurisprudence, Congress could have lawfully
conditioned funds to directly support the new Medicaid
expansion on a state’s agreement to implement those (and only
those) programs. Even though the expansion is intended to
become an ongoing partnership over time, at the moment of its
creation it would be a new program in which the states could
not yet have formed reliance interests. And even though the
funds at issue might be enormous, the conditions attached to
those funds would govern their use directly and
straightforwardly, without impacting the pre-existing Medicaid
program.
Sebelius affirms that Congress remains free to directly
condition the disbursement of large federal grants as it wishes,
subject only to the forgiving Dole limitations.97 The ACA was
coercive, however, because it indirectly conditioned pre-existing
funds by making their continued receipt contingent on
independent state obligations. The Chief Justice held that
Congress may not procure state acceptance of the Medicaid
expansion by threatening to defund pre-existing operations of

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06.
See id. at 2601, 2603.
Id. at 2603–04.
Id.; see also Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 874–76.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607.
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the original program.98
To remedy the defect, Chief Justice Roberts held that the
provision entitling the Secretary to withhold all Medicaid
funding for failure to comply with any Medicaid requirement
could not apply to states rejecting the ACA expansion.99 The
four conservative justices agreed with the result, though not
the rationale, while Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor agreed
only that the stricken penalty provision was severable. The
ultimate ruling left the ACA intact while requiring the federal
government to allow dissenting states to opt out of the
Medicaid expansion while remaining in the pre-existing
Medicaid program.100
Justice Ginsburg excoriated the Chief Justice’s logic in a
dissent joined by Justice Sotomayor, arguing that there was
only one program before the Court: Medicaid.101 For her, the
expansion simply adds beneficiaries to what is otherwise the
same partnership, same purpose, same means, and same
administration: “a single program with a constant aim—to
enable poor persons to receive basic health care when they
need it.”102 She argued that neither the facts nor precedent
supported the Chief’s distinction between the pre-existing
Medicaid program and the ACA expansion on the basis of
whether the expansion was foreseeable at the outset of the
state-federal partnership.103
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the new doctrine—
though purportedly designed to enhance state autonomy—
would have the more likely effect of limiting it, because the
alternative to state-federal spending-power bargaining is often
federal fiat.104 To discourage intergovernmental bargaining of
this sort is to lose one of the more effective means of engaging
state input in federalism-sensitive governance.105 Most
importantly, she criticized the Chief Justice for enforcing a new
limitation on coercion without clarifying the point at which
98. Id. at 2606–07.
99. Id. at 2607–08.
100. For a fuller analysis of the binding precedent that follows from this ruling,
see infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
101. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2630.
103. Id. at 2637–38.
104. Id. at 2632–33 (“The alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears
emphasis, is not state autonomy but state marginalization.”).
105. Id.
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permissible persuasion gives way to undue coercion.106 In
passionate terms, she warned of the myriad ways in which this
inquiry requires “political judgments that defy judicial
calculation.”107
C. Interpreting the Sebelius Doctrine
The Sebelius decision leaves much uncertainty in its wake.
The array of concurring and dissenting opinions complicates
efforts to determine exactly how the decision will bind future
courts, as no rationale was supported by a majority of the
court.108 In Marks v. Whitney, the Supreme Court established
that, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”109 Here, seven
members of the court—the plurality and the conservative
dissenters—concluded that the ACA violated the Spending
Clause, and the Chief Justice’s rationale constitutes the
narrowest grounds on which they all agreed.110
As a technical matter, however, the conservative
dissenters did not actually concur in the judgment, so their
view may not count toward binding precedent under Marks.
Meanwhile, the liberal dissenters concurred in the severance
portion of the Chief Justice’s analysis, but not in the conclusion
that the Spending Clause had been violated. For this reason,
one could argue that the Sebelius doctrine does not constitute
fully binding precedent. Yet as a practical matter, future courts
will follow the rationale they expect a majority of the court to
support, and the Chief Justice’s rationale is the narrowest that
106. Id. at 2640–41; see also Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its
Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1939–40 (2013) (citing Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in Sebelius as a significant development for collective-action theory for
“deem[ing] the logic of collective action constitutionally pertinent to the scope of
Congress’s commerce power”). Professor Siegel emphasizes Justice Ginsburg’s
simultaneous arguments “that Congress could have rationally concluded that the
conduct of the uninsured, as a general class, substantially affects interstate
commerce,” and that “the scope and the nature of the problem rendered the
federal government better situated than the states to solve it.” Id.
107. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. Marks v. Whitney, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
109. Id.
110. See Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 868.
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commanded the accord of the seven justices who found a
spending-power problem.111 This analysis therefore presumes
that the elements of the Chief Justice’s analysis are the
elements that will matter to future interpreters.
Even so, the Chief Justice’s rationale creates considerable
uncertainty of its own. It is striking that such a landmark
decision, establishing a wholly new constitutional limit,
provides so little guidance about when that limit is exceeded.
The Chief Justice would find coercion when both the size of a
recurring grant and its intersecting conditions make it
realistically impossible for a state to refuse112—but his opinion
offers neither a threshold nor a limiting principle for
evaluating coerciveness in either manifestation. Punting on the
most critical points of the analysis, he merely observed that
previous justices had not attempted to “fix a line” between
persuasion and coercion, and so neither would he.113 Yet prior
decisions upheld challenged legislation under the spending
power,114 while Sebelius articulates a new constitutional
limit—arguably creating responsibility to do more.115
Nevertheless, Sebelius interpreters must make sense of the
new constitutional limit with precious little direction. The
primary sources of uncertainty involve: (a) the point at which a
federal grant becomes large enough to exert coercive effect on a
state, and (b) the point at which changes to an ongoing
spending partnership create independent obligations for
continued receipt of the original funds, or “crossover
conditions.”
111. See id. at 868, n.24 (“But even though the aggregation of votes across
those who joined the Court’s judgment and those who dissented ‘does not establish
any authoritative legal propositions’ that bind the lower courts, as a practical
matter, lower courts can be expected to seek to identify and apply those
propositions that would command the assent of five Justices to avoid reversal.”)
(citations omitted).
112. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–05 (applying the “reality” criterion in the
context of the ACA).
113. Id. at 2606 (“The Court found it ‘[e]nough for present purposes that
wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.’ We have no need to fix a line
either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely
beyond it.”) (citation omitted).
114. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
115. Cf. Huberfeld et al., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing how Justice Roberts
and the joint dissent “expressly declined to articulate any test or rubric for
deciding whether a Spending Clause program crosses the coercion line,” offering
mere “slogans” that are “conspicuously fact specific and provide little guidance to
future courts and litigants.”).
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Size of the Grant

The Sebelius doctrine’s first indicator for potential coercion
is the large size of an ongoing federal grant, but the decision
provides dauntingly weak tools for identifying when this
threshold is exceeded. The only guideposts for analysis are the
decision’s affirmation that the $614 million in highway funds
at issue in Dole (less than half of 1 percent of the state’s overall
budget) were too small for the threat of loss to be coercive,
coupled with its holding that the threatened loss of $233 billion
in Medicaid grants (on average, 10 percent of a state’s budget)
sufficed.116 The highway funds at issue in Dole represented
0.19 percent of combined state expenditures that year, while
the Medicaid funds at issue in Sebelius represented 21.86
percent of all state expenditures that year.117
We can probably conclude that any federal grants smaller
than the size-related threshold of safety set by Dole will pass
muster, while those larger than the Medicaid grants at issue in
Sebelius will not. However, there are no federal grants larger
than those at issue in Sebelius: Medicaid includes the largest of
all federal grants to states, followed by those for public
education and then highways.118
The doctrine thus leaves the many federal grant programs
in the zone between 0.5 to 10 percent of a state’s budget on
uncertain ground for the purposes of Sebelius scrutiny—
including those relating to public education,119 civil rights,120

116. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (identifying the federal funds at issue in
Dole and Sebelius).
117. Id. at 2664 (Scalia, J., et al., dissenting) (“In South Dakota v. Dole, the
total amount that the States would have lost if every single State had refused to
comply with the 21-year-old drinking age was approximately $614 million—or
about 0.19% of all state expenditures combined. Under the ACA, by contrast, the
Federal Government has threatened to withhold 42.3% of all federal outlays to the
states, or approximately $233 billion . . . equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures
combined.”).
118. Id. at 2663–64 (noting that education grants are second only to Medicaid
in size, comprising 9.8 percent of total state spending); see also NAT’L ASS’N. OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT
62 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20%
20State%20Expenditure%20Report_2.pdf and http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/
files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report_0.pdf [hereinafter “NASBO FY
2010 REPORT”] (summary and full report, respectively, describing federal
contributions to state expenditures and showing that total transportation funds
comprised 7.7 percent of total state spending that year, second only to education).
119. E.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2013)

RYAN_FINAL

1028

5/31/2014 2:28 PM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

highway infrastructure,121 social services,122
housing,123 and environmental law.124

[Vol. 85

affordable

(reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 USC §
6301). Federal grants for elementary and secondary public education totaled
$70.678 billion in FY 2010. NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 16. Note
that a subsequent NASBO Report has become available since the Supreme
Court’s citations to the 2010 data in Sebelius, but this Article relies on the 2010
data to remain consistent with the Sebelius benchmarks.
120. E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e17 (2013) (conditioning federal funds on state promises not to discriminate on the
basis of race, sex, disability, and other proscribed categories); Title IX of
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1683 (conditioning federal
educational grants on gender equity in implementation); Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (grants to states to support
the education of children with disabilities); DEPT. OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUCATION:
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST I-16 (2012), available at http://www2.ed.
gov/about/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/i-specialed.pdf (reporting that
federal grants through IDEA were $11,505,211,000 in FY 2009 and FY 2010).
121. NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 62 (describing federal grants
for transportation, totaling $124.4 billion in 2010).
122. E.g., Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind & Disabled, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381–1382e(a) (2013) (grants to states to offer assistance to qualifying persons;
these grants totaled $48 billion in 2009. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
INTRODUCTION TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) PROGRAM
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3367)); Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. §
2013 (grants to states to provide food stamps to qualifying persons, totaling $74.6
billion in 2012, according to SNAP Monthly Data, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/34snapmonthly.
htm); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 42 U.S.C. § 603 (grants
to states to offer assistance to qualifying poor families, from an annual block grant
totaling $16.5 billion, according to GENE FALK, CRS REPORT, THE TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: RESPONSES TO
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL32760.pdf); Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§
301–306 (allocated at the discretion of the Secretary).
123. E.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2013) (Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968) (providing federal grants to states for affordable housing
projects, totaling $612 million in 2010, according to NASBO FY 2010 REPORT,
supra note 118, at 85).
124. See infra Part III (describing impacted environmental laws in detail) and
NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 84 (all federal grants for
environmental expenditures, totaling $1.5 billion in 2010). State capital
expenditures for environmental purposes in 2010 composed 5.9 percent of total
capital spending. Id. at 79.
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The Sebelius Zone of Coercive Size Uncertainty
Persuasion ? ? ? Coercion

Total Federal Outlay:

% Total State Expenditures:
% of Single State Budget:

Dole Grant
$614 million
($1.2 billion
today)125
0.19%
> 0.5% (South
Dakota)

Sebelius Grant
$233 billion

21.86%
10% on average

Persuasion ? ? ? Coercion

Indeed, the Sebelius upper threshold is itself loosely
calculated: the Chief Justice appears to derive the 10 percent
figure associated with the Medicaid grant by simply adjusting
the average state budget’s proportion of Medicaid spending (20
percent) by the lower range estimate of the average federal
contribution (50 to 83 percent).126 50 percent of 20 percent
yields a threshold of coercion at approximately 10 percent of a
state’s annual budget, but later interpreters are left longing for
something more determinative of coercion than cocktail-napkin
math. The difficulty of establishing more precisely where
persuasion gives way to coercion is surely one reason the Court
has declined to do so previously, reluctant to impose a
discretionary constraint so vague that it can only exacerbate
the existing uncertainty in federalism-sensitive lawmaking and
litigation.

125. Dole’s $614 million in 1987 dollars would amount to $1.2 billion inflationadjusted dollars in 2012. See, e.g., US Inflation Calculator, COINNEWS MEDIA
GROUP, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index)
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012)
(“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total
budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.” (citing
NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 11, Table 5). I searched the opinion
but was unable to determine any other source for the Chief Justice’s use of this 10
percent figure.
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Crossover Condition

The Sebelius doctrine also requires that interpreters
distinguish (1) conditional funds that directly sponsor the
program in question from (2) federal funds sponsoring one
program that are conditioned on state participation in another
program. While the former remain presumptively permissible,
the latter are potentially coercive under the new limit.
Remarkably, the decision provides no means at all for
evaluating when programmatic amendments are within the
permissible threshold of statutory evolution and when they
amount to an independent program triggering Sebelius
scrutiny. The plurality acknowledged this problem in conceding
that Congress enacted the ACA as an amendment to the same
Medicaid statute that the federal and state governments have
jointly implemented for decades, but concluded that it need not
defer to Congress’s judgment about the boundaries between
legislative programs.127 Beyond noting that Congress cannot
just “surprise” states with “retroactive conditions,”128 the
decision provides no tools for determining when modifications
to an existing program create an independent program
vulnerable to the new limit.129
D. Critiquing Sebelius
This second zone of uncertainty is an especially troubling
feature of the new rule. When the Court creates a new doctrine
in uncharted constitutional territory, it may be an exercise in
judicial prudence to say no more than is necessary to allow the

127. Id. at 2605 (“We cannot agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion
dictated by the Affordable Care Act are all one program simply because ‘Congress
styled’ them as such. If the expansion is not properly viewed as a modification of
the existing Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so title it is irrelevant.”)
(citation omitted).
128. Id. at 2606 (noting that the spending power does not enable Congress to
“surpris[e] participating States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions’”).
129. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid
Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1283, 1286–89 (2013) (approving the result in Sebelius but not the rationale,
and proposing his own framework for analyzing conditional grants). Professor
Berman’s work distinguishes between the anti-compulsion and anti-coercion
principles and argues that the government “unconstitutionally penalizes the
exercise of a right if it withholds a benefit for certain bad purposes or reasons.” Id.
at 1288.
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gradual, case-by-case process of judicial refinement to begin its
work. That said, Sebelius falls short of what is necessary.
Constitutional interpretation draws on the common law
tradition that enables the incremental development of legal
principles, but even the common law tradition anticipates
judicial discretion within bounds. When the Court creates a
new rule, that Court is responsible for providing those bounds.
Further development of the principle can take place through
judicial elaboration over time—in other words, one doesn’t have
to decide everything all at once—but when innovating from
scratch, there is an obligation to at least articulate meaningful
limiting principles.
The Sebelius spending-power holding absolves itself of too
much. It creates principles without discernable limits, leaving
too much uncertainty for future interpreters in all branches of
both state and federal government. It engages existing
precedent in a cavalier manner, lacking the more satisfying
integration with principal case law that one might expect from
a new constitutional statement that does not purport to
overrule prior cases. It gives no deference to Congress’s
conceptualization of Medicaid as a legislative whole, even
though the case turns on this issue of conceptual labeling, and
despite Dole’s admonishment that courts should give
“substantial” deference to Congress in evaluating spendingpower constraints.130
In the end, “I know it when I see it” reasoning won’t do
when assessing the labyrinthine political dimensions of
130. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Chief Justice twice declined deference to
Congress’s own characterization of what it was doing in the Sebelius decision, first
when he held that the individual mandate was a tax rather than a penalty (as
Congress had characterized it), Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95, 2597–98; and
here, when he held the Medicaid expansion was an independent program rather
than an amendment (as Congress had characterized it), id. at 2605. While courts
are not bound by the mere form of legislative language, it is striking that the
Chief Justice was unmoved by the usual norms of judicial-legislative deference
even when the crucial issues of the case turned on questions of congressional
labeling.
Moreover, while he found the individual mandate a hard question in part
because of Congress’s chosen terminology, he had no such qualms disregarding
Congress’s legislative conceptualization for the purposes of the spending analysis:
“We cannot agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by the
Affordable Care Act are all one program simply because ‘Congress styled’ them as
such. If the expansion is not properly viewed as a modification of the existing
Medicaid program, Congress’s decision to so title it is irrelevant.” Id.
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intergovernmental bargaining under the spending power, but
neither the Chief Justice nor the more conservative dissenters
provide more than that in their various assertions that such a
limit must exist. As it stands, the decision effectively leaves
any major, ongoing spending-power partnership improved by
experience vulnerable to legal challenge under Sebelius, and
purely at the discretion of the reviewing court. Yet, as Justice
Ginsburg warns, it is highly dubious for the Court to assume
institutional responsibility for determining the overall
structure of complex regulatory programs, especially with no
deference to legislative conclusions. In so doing, the reviewing
Court substitutes its judgment for that of Congress in an
enterprise in which legislative capacity apexes while judicial
capacity hits its nadir.131
Moreover, the rule threatens to be unworkable in
implementation given legislative norms. No present Congress
can bind future congressional choices,132 so every ongoing
spending-power deal is necessarily limited to its budgetary
year as a matter of law. Programs are renewed on an annual
basis, with amendments as needed to adjust for changing social
circumstances. But after Sebelius, Congress can never modify a
vulnerable partnership like Medicaid without potentially
creating two tracks—one for states that like the change, and
another for those that prefer the original (and with further
modifications, three tracks, ad infinitum). The next time
Congress decides to modify Medicaid—perhaps with insight
gleaned from its experience with the ACA expansion—will it be
required to manage three separate systems, to protect the
choices of states that preferred the original Medicaid system,
the ACA expansion, and now the new modification?
Perhaps the saving grace of the unworkable opinion is that
its own vagueness could ultimately confine it to its facts—
making Sebelius the Bush v. Gore133 of spending-power
jurisprudence. Given the enormous uncertainties associated
with applying the rule, it may be that it will affect future
changes only to the one statute we already know is vulnerable:

131. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2639–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996)
(affirming the “centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind the
legislative authority of its successors”).
133. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (resolving the dispute over the 2000 presidential
election in a decision explicitly confining its reach to the facts at hand).
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Medicaid. After all, Medicaid is unique among cooperativefederalism programs for both its enormous size and its
uncertain footing in sources of federal authority beyond the
spending power (at least under the limited view of the
commerce authority embraced elsewhere in Sebelius by the
Chief Justice and the conservative dissenters). Federal grants
for state primary and secondary education are the next largest
after Medicaid, and even in states with smaller than average
Medicaid grants, Medicaid grants are at least twice the size of
federal educational funding as a percentage of total state
expenditures.134
Vulnerable provisions that condition federal educational
funds on potentially “independent” conditions may also be
upheld under independent sources of federal authority even if
they prove infirm under the spending-power limit.135 For
example, civil rights laws like Titles VI and IX, which prevent
race and sex discrimination by recipients of federal funds, may
find justification in direct congressional authority under
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment even if they were
somehow held infirm under the spending power.136
Many of the nation’s environmental spending-power
partnerships are also understood to be simultaneously
grounded in another source of federal authority, usually the
Commerce Clause. However, several Supreme Court cases
following the New Federalism revival have challenged the
commerce basis of some of those laws, threatening the reach of
federal environmental law.137 Indeed, if future courts extend
the Chief Justice’s narrowing commerce analysis of the ACA’s
individual mandate, it could further undermine the Commerce

134. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The
Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 612–62 (2013)
(analyzing the effects of Sebelius on various forms of federal educational funding,
including the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the Individuals with
Disabilities Act, discussing the implications for the future of conditional spending
in federal education law).
136. See EMILY J. MARTIN, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY,
TITLE IX AND THE NEW SPENDING CLAUSE (Issue Brief) (2012), http://www.acslaw.
org/sites/default/files/Martin_-_Title_IX_and_the_New_Spending_Clause_1.pdf
(discussing independent sources of federal authority for these programs).
137. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 786 (2006); Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74
(2001) (environmental federalism cases challenging the reach of the Clean Water
Act over intrastate wetlands on both statutory and constitutional grounds).
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Clause foundations of some environmental laws. For this
reason, it is worth analyzing their spending-power foundations
in light of the new Sebelius doctrine, and how they would fare
if challenged.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER SEBELIUS
This Part considers the post-Sebelius vulnerability of the
nation’s major environmental laws that involve programs of
cooperative federalism. After reviewing efforts by the literature
to make sense of the Sebelius limit, I test the new doctrine by
applying it to a diverse collection of environmental federalism
partnerships: the Clean Air and Water Acts; the Coastal Zone
Management Act; the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; the Endangered
Species Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the
Safe Drinking Water Act; and the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act.

Major Environmental Programs
of Cooperative Federalism










Clean Air Act (CAA)
Clean Water Act (CWA)
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, &
Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”)
Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA)
Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)

The analysis identifies those statutes that do not implicate
the Sebelius doctrine, those that implicate only its first and
second elements, and finally, the one statute that potentially
implicates all three: the Clean Air Act’s crossover conditioning
of federal highway funds. The second half of Part III focuses
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specifically on the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions,
evaluating the vulnerabilities of the program but concluding
that it should nevertheless survive Sebelius scrutiny.
Demonstrating how the elements of the doctrine engage with
the various features of different state-federal partnerships
provides insight not only into environmental law after Sebelius,
but also the likely impacts of the new spending-power limit on
other areas of law.
Yet as foreshadowed above, the most difficult part of the
analysis is figuring out exactly how to test that limit.
Immediately after the decision came down in 2012,
commentators began struggling to ascertain the impacts of
Sebelius on existing spending-power partnerships.138 Spending
deals tying federal funds to wholly unrelated policy goals have
long been constitutionally infirm,139 but after Sebelius,
indirectly related conditions may also be vulnerable when the
funds at issue are large enough to undermine genuine state
consent. Future courts will have to divine when the size of
federal grants between Dole’s permissible and Sebelius’s
impermissible baselines trigger scrutiny.140 But as a threshold
matter, when is an indirectly related condition sufficiently
remote to constitute an “independent” program?
A common theme in the literature is the lack of a coherent
test. In analyzing the impacts of the new doctrine on the Title
IX federal education spending partnership, Emily Martin of the
National Women’s Law Center concludes that the Court
articulated no clear test and accordingly analyzes the
vulnerability of Title IX by distinguishing it point by point from
Medicaid.141 Writing for the Congressional Research Service,
Kenneth Thomas observes that the test is unclear, but that the
limit appears to hinge on whether the states had adequate
notice of a change in conditional funding, the relatedness of the
change to the conditioned funds, and the size of the funds.142
138. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
139. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
140. As discussed supra at notes 116–17 and accompanying text, grants larger
than the $233 billion at stake under pre-ACA Medicaid are likely to be
scrutinized, while those smaller than the $614 million/$1.2 billion in highway
funds at issue in Dole are not. See also the figure following text at supra note 124.
141. See generally Martin, supra note 136. Emily Martin is General Counsel
for the National Women’s Law Center.
142. See generally KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL
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Professor Sam Bagenstos identifies similar elements and
makes sense of the Sebelius limit as an “anti-leveraging
principle,” prohibiting the use of the spending power to
leverage a state’s substantial reliance on one spending-power
program to coerce agreement to another.143 He defends the
anti-leveraging principle as justifiable in theory, but
acknowledges that the decision fails to identify a workable
threshold for the “independent program” element.144
However, all analyses converge on the three main elements
in the Sebelius doctrine identified in Part II, and Professor
Bagenstos convincingly shows that all of them must be
manifest before the coercion limit is triggered, according to the
logic of the Chief Justice’s analysis and where it departs from
the conservative dissent.145 The scholarly consensus thus
appears to be that in order to violate the presumptive
constraint, the following three elements must be present: First,
the new offer must unfairly surprise the state by changing the
terms of participation in an entrenched spending-power
partnership in which that state has established reasonable
reliance interests. Second, the size of the grant at issue must
be so large and forgoing it so economically infeasible to the
state that its consent to the new offer is effectively involuntary.
Third, the new offer must condition funds for the existing
program on compliance with independent obligations that are
not directly related to the disbursement of the funds within the
original program (a crossover condition).146

The Elements of Sebelius Analysis
0.
1.
2.
3.

Congress uses spending power to engage states
Entrenched spending partnership creates state reliance
Grant at issue so big, loss would affect coercion
‘Crossover’ condition ties existing $ to independent term

Applying these criteria to the state-federal partnerships in
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES V. SEBELIUS (2012).
143. Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 866.
144. Id. at 898–99, 905–06.
145. Id. at 870–71.
146. Id.

RYAN_AUTHORRETURN

2014]

5/31/2014 2:28 PM

SPENDING POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1037

the nation’s environmental laws should provide comfort to
advocates for federal environmental regulation and
disappointment to opponents. Many federal environmental laws
include ongoing spending-power partnerships, but few appear
vulnerable on any of the three criteria. Several authorize
modest grants in one-time spending deals, but not in the kind
of ongoing, multiple-iteration way that could create reasonable
reliance interests on the part of a state. A few include annual
renewals that could create unfair surprise if the terms were
suddenly altered, but none involve grants on the scale of
Medicaid, and only one—the Clean Air Act—includes a
potentially vulnerable crossover provision conditioning funds
for one purpose on state assent to indirectly related terms.
The following provides presumptive Sebelius analyses for
the major federal environmental laws with programs of
cooperative federalism, ordered from the least to most
vulnerable. To summarize the ten independent analyses that
follow:
The Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know
Act does not rely on the spending power and thus does not
implicate Sebelius. Neither does the Clean Water Act’s
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
although other parts of the Clean Water Act, discussed below,
come closer. Four other statutes involve discrete spendingpower partnerships: the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act;
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act; the Endangered Species Act;
and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act—but in
each of these, the relevant federal funds are offered as one-time
grants responding to specific tasks. By definition, these
programs cannot create state expectations triggering even the
first of Sebelius’s three elements.
Of all federal environmental laws, only four include
recurring grant programs that meaningfully trigger Sebelius’s
first element, only two of these potentially trigger the second
element, and only one potentially triggers all three. The
Coastal Zone Management Act includes a program of recurring
grants to states, but these grants are comparatively tiny. The
Clean Water Act’s State Revolving Fund creates an ongoing
spending partnership with more heft than the Coastal Zone
Management Act, but the grants at issue still fall shy of the
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available benchmarks for coercive size.147 The Safe Drinking
Water Act involves grants potentially large enough to warrant
scrutiny for size as well as reliance, but these grants are
directly conditioned. Only the Clean Air Act—which links a
state’s satisfaction of air-quality requirements to its receipt of
substantial federal highway funds—potentially includes all
three indicators: an ongoing spending partnership involving
large grants with a vulnerable crossover term.

Two Views of Environmental Federalism After Sebelius
1. Sebelius Applied to Environmental Federalism
 Sebelius Not Implicated: No Spending Partnership (SP)
o EPCRA
o CWA NPDES Program
 Implicates Sebelius: SPs with One-Time Grant
o CERCLA
o RCRA
o SMCRA
o ESA
 Sebelius Element 1: Ongoing SPs with Small Grant
o CZMA Administrative Grants
o CWA State Revolving Fund ($164–238M < $614M)
 Elements 1 & 2: Ongoing SPs with Large Grant
o SDWA State Revolving Loan Fund ($1.4B)
o CAA SIP Sanctions ($62B)
 Elements 1, 2, & 3: Ongoing, Large Grant, & Crossover
o CAA Highway Fund Sanctions

147. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice
Roberts’s determination that the $614 million in highway grants at issue in Dole
were too small to act coercively but the $233 billion Medicaid grants at issue in
Sebelius were coercive in size).
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2. Environmental Federalism as Sebelius Typology
Type of Cooperative
Federalism Program
No Spending
Partnership
Spending Partnership
with One-Time Grants

Ongoing Spending
Partnership with Small
Recurring Grants

Ongoing Spending
Partnership with Large
Recurring Grants

Ongoing Spending
Partnership with Large
Grants & Crossover
Condition

Relevant
Environmental
Statutes
EPCRA
CWA NPDES Program
CERCLA
RCRA
ESA
SMCRA
CZMA Administrative
Grants
CWA State Revolving
Fund ($164–238
million)
SDWA State Revolving
Loan Fund ($1.4
billion)
CAA SIP Sanctions
($62 billion)
CAA SIP Sanctions &
Highway Funds

Sebelius
Application
Sebelius doctrine not
implicated
Sebelius doctrine
implicated, but first
threshold element
not triggered
Sebelius doctrine
implicated and first
element triggered,
but second and third
elements not
triggered
Sebelius doctrine
implicated, first and
second elements
triggered, but third
element not
triggered (no
crossover conditions)
Sebelius doctrine
implicated and all
three elements
triggered

The following Sections walk through application of the
Sebelius doctrine to each law, demonstrating the independent
operation of the three different elements of the doctrine. The
analysis concludes that all will ultimately pass constitutional
muster.
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A. Non-Spending Power Programs of Environmental
Federalism: Sebelius Is Not Implicated
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA). EPCRA engages state and local actors in coordinated
planning for chemical emergencies, provides for notification of
emergency releases of chemicals, and addresses communities’
rights to know about toxic and hazardous chemicals.148 The Act
establishes State Emergency Response Commissions, drawing
technical expertise in the field of emergency response from
various state agencies.149 It further authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to order any facility
owner or operator to comply with emergency planning
provisions.150 However, as EPCRA partnerships are not
premised on any spending-power bargaining, they do not
implicate the Sebelius doctrine.151
Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES). The Clean Water Act,152 which regulates
point-source pollutants to the nation’s waters,153 provides
another example of a significant program of environmental
federalism that operates independently of the spending power.
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012).
149. See id. §§ 11001(a), 11045; see also State Emergency Response
Commissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/epcra/
sercs.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (listing commissioners).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a), 11045 (2013).
151. EPCRA is likely premised on the Commerce Clause and other sources of
federal authority to assist states with emergency response, although this has yet
to be confirmed in any official congressional or judicial statement. The House of
Representatives now requires that new bills specify the applicable source of
constitutional authority, but EPCRA was passed prior to the enactment of this
House Rule in 2010. See CLERK OF THE H.R., 113TH CONG., RULES OF THE H.R. r.
XII, cl. 7(c)(1) (2013) (providing that sponsors must submit a statement citing “as
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the
Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution” to be published in the
Congressional Record).
152. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2013)).
153. A “point source” discharge, which enters a regulated watercourse through
the end of a pipe, must be permitted under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 787,126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001) (confirming the
basis of federal authority for the Clean Water Act in the Commerce Clause).
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State and federal actors cooperate in enforcing the Clean Water
Act’s pollution permitting program through shared supervision
of the NPDES program, which prohibits the discharge of
pollutants into protected water bodies without a permit.154 The
law allows the EPA either to act as the permitting authority or
to delegate permitting authority to willing states.155 All but a
handful of states have chosen to self-administer the program
even without offsetting federal funding, because they prefer the
greater autonomy it allows them in managing in-state water
resources and economic development.156 As the arrangement is
not premised on the exchange of federal money, it too is
invulnerable to a Sebelius challenge. (Other CWA programs
that do involve the spending power are discussed below.)
B. Spending Partnerships with One-Time Grants:
Implicates Doctrine but Does Not Trigger First
Threshold Element
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA, the “Superfund” act,
imposes liability for the use, harboring, or transportation of
hazardous substances that substantially endanger human
health or the environment.157 The program enables Congress to
allocate discretionary § 104(k) “Superfund” grants to encourage
state participation and leadership in cleanup efforts.158 States
and tribes are also eligible for § 128(a) Brownfield Grants to
cope with less-contaminated sites.159 However, like those at
issue in RCRA, none of these grants could reasonably be

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2013).
Id. § 1342(a).
E.g., N.M. ENV’T DEP’T, NPDES STATE PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION
BRIEFING PAPER (2004), http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/PSRS/NPDESDelegationBriefingPaper_June-04.pdf (discussing
the benefits of selfadministration).
157. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2013).
158. See id. § 9604.
159. Id. §§ 9604(k) (discussing brownfields revitalization funding),
9628(a)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that States and tribes may use grants to capitalize a
revolving loan fund for brownfield remediation). Section 128(a) was added to
CERCLA in 2002 by the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act. Pub. L. No. 107-118, § 128(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2376–2377
(2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2013)).
154.
155.
156.
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construed as ongoing in a way that would create Sebeliusworthy reliance interests.160 Congress makes Superfund grants
to the states for the limited purpose of cleaning up toxic
Superfund sites. Once the site has been remediated, the
receiving state would not ordinarily expect ongoing federal
funding under this program.
Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA provides for the
conservation of endangered and threatened species of fish,
plants, and other wildlife.161 Section Six authorizes grants to
states through the Cooperative Endangered Species
Conservation Fund, Habitat Conservation Planning Assistance
Grants, and Habitat Conservation Plan Land Acquisition
Grants.162 However, ESA spending partnerships are very
limited in size and scope.163 Like RCRA and CERCLA funds,
the ESA’s one-time grants do not trigger the doctrine’s first
element of an ongoing partnership.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA is
a cooperative-federalism program regulating hazardous

160. CERCLA is also firmly authorized under both the Commerce and Tax
powers, potentially providing additional constitutional support for Congressional
regulation involving state participants. For cases indicating CERCLA’s firm
footing in the commerce power, see Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d
176 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.
1997). The Superfund itself is supported by a tax on the petrochemical industry,
utilities, and crude oil importers, and through reimbursement from responsible
parties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611–12, 9631–33, 9661–62, 9671–72 (1995), suggesting that
CERCLA is also authorized independently by the same tax power under which
Sebelius upheld the ACA. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive
Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 149 at n.18
(2001) (discussing the use of the Tax power in the Superfund program).
161. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§1531–1544 (2012)). The ESA was enacted
pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
162. Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/grants/S6_grants.html.
163. Traditional Section Six Conservation Grants provide financial assistance
to state activities preserving listed species, including habitat restoration, species
status surveys, public education, and outreach, captive propagation and
reintroduction, nesting surveys, genetic studies, and development of management
plans. Id. In 2008, all such grants made to the Midwestern states were for less
than $50,000 per year, and the majority fell within the $10,000 to $20,000 federal
contribution range. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Midwest Region, Traditional
Section Six Grants Made to States in 2008, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
endangered/grants/2008/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (providing links to
grant information for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin).
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substances through “cradle to grave” oversight.164 The statute
enables states to choose whether to become authorized to
implement the program within their boundaries or submit to
federal regulation.165 The statute originally provided funding
mechanisms to assist states developing and implementing new
regulatory programs, and these funds have been sporadically
reauthorized by Congress, but none involve recurring grants
that could create state expectations implicating Sebelius’s first
element. Once a state successfully implements the new
program, it could have no reasonable expectations for grant
renewals that could trigger further scrutiny under Sebelius.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).
SMCRA prevents water pollution, soil erosion, ecological
destruction, and social and economic disruption as a result of
surface mining.166 States may implement their own regulatory
programs or submit to federal regulation.167 The Act further
authorizes cooperative agreements with states to enable state
regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations
on federal lands within the state.168 The Act provides for
discretionary grants to assist states in developing,
administering and enforcing state programs, but grants cease
after a state becomes fully certified to regulate.169 Because
grants are designed to end after a temporary start-up period,
states cannot form reasonable expectations of a long-term
funding partnership that could implicate Sebelius.170
164. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified as part of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–
6992 (2013)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (explicitly noting that improper
disposal of hazardous substances affects interstate commerce).
165. EPA, Authorizing States to Implement RCRA, in RCRA ORIENTATION
MANUAL 2011, at III-133, III-134 (2011), www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/
pubs/orientat/rom311.pdf (“As of August 2008, all states, with the exception of
Alaska and Iowa, are authorized to implement the RCRA hazardous waste
program.”).
166. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2013)).
167. See id. §§ 1253, 1254 (describing the state and federal programs for
regulating surface coal mining and reclamation operations).
168. Id. § 1273.
169. Id. § 1295; OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION & ENFORCEMENT,
Regulatory Programs Overview, in FEDERAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (2010),
http://www.osmre.gov/lrg/fam/5-100.pdf; Basics of SMCRA Title IV, W. PA. COAL.
FOR ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION (May 2007), http://www.wpcamr.org/
projects/smcra_reauth/TitleIV%20Basics.pdf.
170. SMCRA is also authorized under the Commerce Clause, as recognized in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface
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C. Spending Partnerships with Small Recurring Grants:
Triggers First Element Only
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). The CZMA is a
voluntary program of cooperative federalism fully structured as
a spending-power partnership, designed to protect coastal
resources from interregional development pressure.171 The
CZMA offers four different kinds of federal funding to
encourage states to create coastal management plans: § 306
administrative grants, § 309 enhancement grants, § 6217
nonpoint pollution control grants, and § 315 estuarine research
reserve grants.172
Administrative grants are ongoing grants,173 potentially
implicating the first element of Sebelius. But as they typically
fall far shy of even the Dole threshold of size-related safety,
they are unlikely to reach the threshold of coercive size. In
fiscal year 2012, a mere $65.9 million was allocated toward all
coastal management programs.174 This figure encompasses
more than just the recurring administrative grants, but even if
all of such funding were to trigger Sebelius scrutiny (and even
unadjusted for inflation), it still amounts to a small fraction of
the $614 million Dole threshold, which tops $1 billion in today’s
dollars.175
Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund. The Clean Water
Act, the comprehensive water-quality statute that includes the
NPDES permitting program discussed previously,176 also
includes various provisions authorizing federal grants to
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981)).
171. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280
(1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2013)). The CZMA was
enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power. See Winter v. Natural Resources
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 18 (2008) (discussing the president’s authority to
grant exemptions from the CZMA, and quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B)).
172. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455 (administrative grants), 1456b (enhancement grants),
1455b (nonpoint pollution control grants), 1456-1 (estuarine research reserve
grants).
173. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (grants are available to coastal states for the purpose of
administering a qualifying management program).
174. This figure includes not only the administrative grants but also
enhancement and coastal nonpoint pollution control program grants. FY 2012
OCRM Budget Allocations by Program, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/
funding/welcome.html.
175. See supra note 125 and accompanying graph.
176. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
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states.177 The most significant for purposes of Sebelius scrutiny
are those made under the State Revolving Fund (SRF) for the
purpose of distributing low-interest loans to cities and towns
for infrastructure and water-quality projects.178 Established in
the Water Quality Act of 1987, the CWA SRF provides states
with annual capitalization grants to fund municipal projects for
wastewater treatment (§ 212), nonpoint source pollution
control (§ 319), and watershed and estuary management (§
320).179
Grants are awarded to states to develop conservation
plans, implement management programs, and to issue loans to
local communities to construct treatment works.180 Twentyseven states have implemented programs that leverage these
funds by issuing bonds secured by SRF assets, increasing the
value of the federal grants to finance more projects over
time.181 Since 1987, cumulative assistance under the SRF has
surpassed $69 billion.182 In the last decade, annual federal
spending in the program has ranged from a high of $238.5
million in 2003 to a low of $155.9 million in 2013.183

177. The CWA includes fourteen categorical grant programs to states,
including those to provide water pollution control program support, public water
system supervision, underground water source protection, beach monitoring, and
nonpoint source pollution control. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER
PROGRAM GUIDANCE FISCAL YEAR 2011, 49–50 (Apr. 2010), http://nepis.epa.
gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100E5WU.pdf.
178. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1381 (2013).
179. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1382 (annual capitalization grants funding municipal
projects for wastewater treatment), 1329 (nonpoint source pollution control), 1330
(watershed and estuary management).
180. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381 (discussing capitalization grants to the states
to develop and implement conservation and management plans), 1382 (water
pollution control revolving fund), 1383 (water pollution control revolving loan
funds).
181. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT: CLEAN WATER STATE
REVOLVING FUND PROGRAMS 11 (2007), http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/
cwsrf/upload/2008_07_29_cwfinance_cwsrf_2007-annual-report.pdf (noting that
“27 states have chosen to implement leveraging approaches by issuing revenue
and general obligation bonds that are secured by CWSRF assets,” and that
“[t]hrough leveraging, states have increased their capacity to finance important
water quality projects by $20.6 billion”).
182. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: CLEAN WATER STATE
REVOLVING FUND PROGRAMS 2 (2008), http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/cwsrf/
upload/2009_05_05_cwfinance_cwsrf_cwsrf_ar2008_final.pdf (noting that from its
initiation in 1987 until 2008, “the CWSRF has provided $69 billion in cumulative
assistance for wastewater infrastructure, nonpoint source, and estuary projects”).
183. Clean Water Act Section 319(h) Grant Funds History, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/319hhistory.cfm (last updated Oct. 9,
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CWA State Revolving Fund grants are substantially larger
than CZMA administrative grants. The fact that grants are
made on a recurring basis clearly triggers the first “reliance”
element of Sebelius. However, even the largest of these grants
would survive scrutiny under the remaining elements, because
they are still much smaller than the Dole standard of sizerelated safety—whether compared in absolute terms or as a
percentage of overall state spending. The SRF 2003 figure of
$238 million is far smaller than the absolute value of the Dole
figure, especially when adjusted for inflation.184 It also
constitutes less than 0.1 percent of total state expenditures for
the fiscal year,185 half the parallel Dole threshold of 0.19
percent of total state expenditures in 1987.186
Moreover (and foreshadowing the subsequent stages of
analysis), both the CZMA and SRF grants would survive
scrutiny even if they exceeded the size threshold, because the
federal conditions that attach to these funds are directly
related to the use of the funds. States are entitled to use these
funds only for qualifying coastal management and waterquality projects, respectively. Because there are no conditions
tying the availability of these funds to a state’s agreement to
indirectly related conditions, the critical third element of a
crossover condition also is missing from both spending-power
partnerships.

2012) (table listing total grants for each year since 1990).
184. Dole’s $614 million in 1987 dollars would amount to $1.2 billion inflationadjusted dollars in 2012. See, e.g., US Inflation Calculator, COINNEWS MEDIA
GROUP, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index)
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
185. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers, total state
expenditures for 2003 totaled $326 billion. 2003 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 6, http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/
files/ER_2003.pdf. The 2003 SRF figure of $238 million is 0.07 percent of total
state expenditures for that year. A perfect comparison to the Dole benchmark
would require calculating a specific state’s SRF grant in proportion to its specific
budget, and figures could vary from this approximation. However, the 0.07
percent figure leaves a large margin for variation without exceeding the Dole
threshold.
186. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012)
and supra text accompanying note 116 (explaining the Dole thresholds).
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D. Spending Partnerships with Large Recurring Grants:
Triggers First and Second Elements
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The SDWA ensures the
quality of drinking water by authorizing the promulgation of
federal standards and federal oversight of the state agencies,
local governments, and water suppliers that implement these
standards.187 The SDWA also authorizes the Drinking Water
State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRLF), an ongoing grant
program similar to the CWA SRF that helps public water
agencies finance the infrastructure projects needed to comply
with federal drinking water regulations.188 Similar to the CWA
SRF, DWSRLF annual capitalization grants enable
participating states to capitalize their own state loan funds,
providing a long-term source of financing for the costs of
maintaining drinking water infrastructure and quality.189
The DWSRLF provides long-term federal financing of state
infrastructure through annual grants, and like the CWA SRF,
it represents an entrenched spending partnership likely to
trigger the Sebelius reliance element.190 But in contrast to
CWA funds, federal DWSRLF funding may have exceeded the
clear safety zone for coercive size established in Dole.191 The
original statute authorized appropriations through only 2003,
providing for $599 million in 1994 and $1 billion for each of the
fiscal years between 1995 and 2003.192 Total funds made
187. Safe Drinking Water Act § 1443, 42 U.S.C. § 300f. The Safe Drinking
Water Act is premised on the Commerce Clause. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d
995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Commerce Clause provides the constitutional
authority for the [Safe Drinking Water] Act.”).
188. Pub. L. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f-j
(2013)). The SDWA also includes a few other recurring grant programs to states
and tribes, including State Public Water System Supervision Grants and State
Underground Water Source Protection Grants, but their size puts them well below
the Dole threshold of concern. See Grants – UIC, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/Grants.cfm (last updated Oct. 17,
2013).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12 (2013).
190. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2636–39 and supra text accompanying note 93
(explaining the Sebelius reliance element).
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12(m) (2013); see also Procedures for Implementing
Certain Provisions of EPA’s Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Affecting the Clean
Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund Programs, available at
http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/cwsrf/upload/FY-2012-SRF-Procedures-andAttachments.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(m) (2013). The Fiscal Year 2012 Consolidated
Appropriations Act sets forth implementing requirements and administration
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available to the states in 2010 approached $1.4 billion193—still
far short of Medicaid’s coercive $233 billion, but now in the
gray zone between that $233 billion and the $614 million/$1.2
billion held acceptable in Dole.194
The DWSRLF’s $1.4 billion dollars in 2010 would have
amounted to $729 million in Dole’s 1987 inflation-adjusted
dollars, exceeding the Dole threshold of safety in absolute
terms.195 However, as a percentage of overall state spending,
2010 DWSRLF spending still constitutes less than 0.1 percent
of total state expenditures,196 lower than the parallel Dole
figure of 0.5 percent of South Dakota’s total budget. Of course,
a perfect comparison to the Dole benchmark would require
calculating a specific state’s grant in proportion to its specific
budget, and figures could vary from this approximation. A state
with a small overall budget but a large DWSRLF grant might
see this percentage exceed 0.5 percent. Either way, we are now
operating in the zone of size-related uncertainty left open after
Sebelius.
The SDWA thus potentially triggers two of the three
Sebelius indicators: it includes an entrenched grant program
creating reliance interests by the states, and its grants might
exceed the threshold for coercive size, at least if a court were to
interpret that limit conservatively. Nonetheless, the program
would still survive scrutiny because it lacks the third
indicator—a crossover condition. Like the CZMA and CWA
SRF, all funds are conditioned directly on their use within the
program.197
priorities for both the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act State
Revolving Fund Programs, and it keeps the DWSRLF program current by
authorizing additional appropriations. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 1016–19 (2011).
193. Final State Allotment of Drinking Water State Revolving Fund
Appropriation for Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.
gov/grants_funding/dwsrf/allotments/Final-State-Allotment-of-Drinking-WaterState-Revolving-Fund-Appropriation-for-Fiscal-Year-2010.cfm.
194. See supra note 125 and accompanying graph.
195. See, e.g., U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, COINNEWS MEDIA GROUP LLC,
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (based on the consumer price index) (last
visited Apr. 11, 2014).
196. See NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 7 (reporting that total
state expenditures in 2010 were $1.6 trillion). The 2010 DWSRLF figure of $1.4
billion is 0.09 percent of the $1.6 trillion of total state expenditures for the year.
197. The SDWA includes other ongoing grant programs to states and tribes
with primary enforcement for federal programs authorized under the Act,
including State Public Water System Supervision Grants and State Underground
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E. Spending Partnerships with Large Recurring Grants
and Crossover Conditions: Triggers All Three Elements
Clean Air Act (CAA). Among all environmental laws, only
the CAA approaches the potentially combustible mix of all
three Sebelius indicators. The CAA is designed to protect and
improve air quality and the stratospheric ozone layer.198 Under
the CAA, states must prepare and maintain an adequate State
Implementation Plan (SIP) for attaining federally designated
air-quality standards, and they must remain in attainment or
risk the sanction of losing certain federal highway funds.199
Federal highway funds are among the largest federal grants to
states,200 and they represent an ongoing spending-power
partnership on which states had long relied before they were
linked to the CAA. Because the CAA conditions the receipt of
federal highway funds on a state’s performance of CAA duties
that are only indirectly related to those highway funds, it
comes closer than any other environmental law to the
vulnerable crossover condition at the heart of the Sebelius
doctrine.
CAA § 179 requires that federal highway funds be
withheld from a state that has failed to prepare an adequate
SIP or failed to implement requirements under an approved
plan when that state includes “non-attainment areas.”201 Nonattainment areas are those that have not achieved the CAA’s
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which define the
level of air quality necessary to protect the public health and
welfare.202 The EPA maintains initial discretion about how and
Water Source Protection Grants, but their size puts them well below the Dole
threshold of concern. See Grants – UIC, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://water.
epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/Grants.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
198. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7626) (2013). The CAA is authorized by the Commerce Clause.
See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996).
199. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509(b)(1) (2013).
200. See supra text accompanying note 118.
201. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509, § 7509(b)(1)(A) (2013). (“The Administrator may
impose a prohibition, applicable to a nonattainment area, on the approval by the
Secretary of Transportation of any projects or the awarding by the Secretary of
any grants, under title 23. . .”). EPA may also apply discretionary sanctions after
determining that a CAA requirement has been violated. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(m);
see also EPA Regulations on Sanctions, 40 C.F.R. § 52.30–52.32; Clean Air Act
Sanctions, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_
quality/highway_sanctions/#subject (last updated Nov. 6, 2013).
202. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7511(a) (ozone), 7512 (carbon monoxide), 7513
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when to apply sanctions after notice and a grace period, but the
Act mandates withholding of funds if noncompliance continues
beyond eighteen and twenty-four months.203 The EPA is then
obligated to prevent disbursement of federal highway funds—
but only those pertaining to the area in non-attainment, and
even then, the penalty excludes funds used to reduce air
pollution emissions, funds that are necessary for traffic
safety,204 and funds for certain specified transportation
projects.205 The EPA also retains discretion to apply leniency
for states that have made good-faith efforts to comply.206
An important detail mitigating SIP requirements and
penalties is the availability of a federal alternative. A state
may effectively opt out of the responsibility to prepare a SIP
and effectively elect a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP),
which shifts planning and implementation responsibilities to
the EPA.207 If a state declines to create a SIP, or if the EPA
concludes that a submitted SIP fails to meet statutory criteria,
the EPA is required to create a FIP for that state within two
years.208 The state is then alleviated of its obligation to prepare
a SIP and the potential for further sanctions under § 179 is
negated.209 Nevertheless, most states prefer the autonomy of
managing their own plans, and the EPA has reportedly used its
potential authority to withhold transportation funds as a
threat to encourage full CAA compliance.210
In contrast to all other environmental laws, then, the CAA
(particulate matter), and 7514 (nitrogen dioxide).
203. Id. § 7509(a)(4) (“If the Administrator has selected one of such sanctions
and the deficiency has not been corrected within 6 months thereafter, sanctions
under both paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of subsection (b) shall apply until the
Administrator determines that the State has come into compliance.”).
204. Id. § 7509(b)(1) (exempting “projects or grants for safety where the
Secretary determines, based on accident or other appropriate data submitted by
the State, that the principal purpose of the project is an improvement in safety to
resolve a demonstrated safety problem and likely will result in a significant
reduction in, or avoidance of, accidents”).
205. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(B).
206. Id. § 7509(a).
207. Id. § 7410(c)(1).
208. See id.
209. Section 179 is ambiguous on this point, but the EPA has formalized this
interpretation in the implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 93.120 (2013), to
which a reviewing court must defer. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
210. See generally JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30131,
HIGHWAY FUND SANCTIONS AND CONFORMITY UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (OCT.
1999), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/transportation/trans-29.cfm.
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courts controversy because it potentially implicates all three
elements of the Sebelius doctrine: (1) a new condition changes
the terms of an entrenched spending partnership, (2) the size of
the grants at issue are potentially coercive, and (3) the new
offer conditions those large federal funds on compliance with
indirectly related obligations.
Federal transportation funds constitute a substantial
component of overall state spending, smaller only than
Medicaid and combined federal spending on primary,
secondary, and higher education. In 2010, states received
around $62 billion in federal highway funds211—still short of
Medicaid’s monster grants, but substantially larger than the
funds at issue in Dole, whether compared in absolute terms or
as a percentage of overall state spending. Highway funds
comprised nearly 4 percent of overall state spending in 2010.212
That said, nearly half that amount was designated for Highway
Law Enforcement and Safety, and Maintenance and Highway
Services, two safety-related programs likely exempt from CAA
withholding.213 The total would be further lowered as other
exempted programs were subtracted from withholding, but it
may yet exceed Dole’s clear margin of safety. Notably, however,
it is hard to apply real numbers in this guessing game, because
while the EPA frequently warns states in noncompliance about
the potential of withholding, it has only actually withheld
highway funds on one occasion, and only for a small part of a
state (in East Helena, Montana in 1996).214

211. David Baake, Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No
Highway” Provision Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius?, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2012) (citing figures from the Federal Highway Administration and the
National Association of State Budget Officers). Baake notes that of the overall $62
billion, only $33 billion was eligible for withholding, reducing the absolute value
and percentage of overall state spending by nearly half. Id.
212. See NASBO FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 118, at 7 (reporting that total
state expenditures in 2010 were $1.6 trillion). The 2010 figure of $62 billion in
highway funds represents 3.86 percent of the $1.6 trillion in total state
expenditures for the year.
213. See Baake, supra note 211, at 8 (noting that of the $62 billion in federal
highway funds, “approximately $9 billion was spent on Highway Law
Enforcement and Safety, and approximately $20 billion was spent on
Maintenance and Highway Services, two spending categories probably eligible for
the safety exemption under Section 179”).
214. Clean Air Act Sanctions, Status of Sanction Clocks Under the Clean Air
Act, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_quality/
highway_sanctions/ sanctionsclock.cfm (updated by EPA, Jan. 7, 2013); see also
JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10004, CLEAN AIR ACT ISSUES IN
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In addition to the large grants involved, the CAA condition
is vulnerable because it changes the terms of an entrenched
transportation spending partnership in a way that could
violate the expectations of states when they first entered into
the partnership. The Department of Transportation has been
administering federal highway funds to the states for over fifty
years, since the Federal-Aid Highway Act was first passed in
1956.215 It is unlikely that states could have foreseen at the
time that the relationship would evolve to include air-quality
regulation.
Most importantly, and alone among environmental laws,
the CAA conditions existing funds dedicated to one purpose
(highways) on a state’s compliance with a separate, indirectly
related program (air-quality management). The conditions are
sufficiently related to satisfy the germaneness requirements of
Dole, because the use of state highways will contribute to that
state’s ambient air-quality problems through automobile
exhaust. However, not all of the pollutants compromising air
quality are emitted by mobile sources using state highways;
power plants, industrial and agricultural operations, and
municipal and domestic uses also contribute. At best, there is
an imperfect correlation between the use of the funds and the
attached condition.
Conditioning highway funds authorized under a
transportation statute on a state’s compliance with air-quality
management obligations that go beyond transportation seems
to present the very crossover fact pattern that the Chief Justice
warned about in Sebelius. The condition is only indirectly
related to the federal funds at peril, and those funds are
authorized by a separate, pre-existing federal grant program
under a separate statute in a different part of the United
States Code.
F. Assessing the Vulnerability of the CAA’s Highway
Sanctions
Legal commentators have reached conflicting conclusions
about potential Sebelius problems with the CAA sanctions. For

106TH
CONGRESS
(2000),
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/ern/00may/air-24.php.
215. Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
THE

available

at
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example, Professor Jonathan Adler suggests that the highway
fund penalty should be stricken, noting that highway funds are
raised from gasoline taxes and are even “less directly related to
air pollution control (particularly from stationary sources) than
traditional Medicaid is to the Medicaid expansion.”216 David
Baake concludes just as certainly that the sanctions are not
unconstitutionally coercive, because the funds at issue are
smaller than Medicaid’s by a factor of seven, and also because
the penalty is so much more avoidable than the one at issue in
the ACA.217
Professor Bagenstos reserves judgment. He concedes that
the provision is vulnerable under the reliance and crossover
elements of the doctrine, but agrees that the CAA and the ACA
may be distinguishable in size and nuance.218 He defends the
connection between highway maintenance and air-quality
regulation, noting Congress’s “desire that highway construction
be carried out in a manner that does not contribute to air
pollution,”219 but emphasizes that the problem is not Dole’s
germaneness inquiry but Sebelius’s crossover condition.220 The
CAA subjects highway funds to a condition that is not directly
related to their use; after all, preparing a SIP is not about
building a highway.221
At least one state has already experimented with the
potential for using Sebelius in litigation against the CAA’s SIP
requirements. On July 20, 2012, Texas state attorneys filed a
notice of supplemental authority suggesting a Sebelius claim in
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, a pending suit
challenging the EPA’s new requirement that states update
their SIPs with greenhouse gas regulations.222 Under the new

216. Jonathan H. Alder, Could the Health Care Decision Hobble the Clean Air
Act?, PERC BLOG (July 23, 2012), http://perc.org/blog/could-health-care-decisionhobble-clean-air-act.
217. Baake, supra note 211.
218. Bagenstos, supra note 86, at 917–20 (quoting Missouri v. United States,
918 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 109 F.3d
440 (8th Cir. 1997)).
219. Id. at 918 (quoting Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333).
220. Id. (noting that lower courts have consistently rejected germaneness
claims and affirmed that the CAA furthers Congress’s purpose because both
mobile and stationary sources contribute to the overall problem of air pollution).
221. Id. at 918–19.
222. Petitioner State of Texas’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, No. 11-1037 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2012), http://www.
eenews.net/assets/2012/07/31/document_pm_03.pdf.
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rule, states may not issue permits for the construction or
improvement of projects that will emit large amounts of
regulated pollutants until qualifying SIPs are approved.223
Frustrated by the consequences of an invalid SIP during this
time, Texas argued that the EPA should allow a buffer period
of three years before invalidating its old SIP.224 The July 2012
filing implied that Texas would be unconstitutionally coerced
otherwise, although the issue was not raised during oral
argument on May 7, 2013.225
The court ultimately dismissed the claim and
distinguished the facts from those at issue in Sebelius, finding
that “the circumstance [sic] here are not comparable to
Congress’s coercive financial threat to withhold all Medicaid
funds from States in the [ACA] provision challenged under the
Spending Clause in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.”226 Though unsuccessful (and
distinguishable from a pure highway fund challenge), Texas’s
claim nevertheless demonstrates that states unhappy with
CAA requirements are seeking opportunities to make use of the
new Sebelius doctrine.
However, Sebelius claims targeting SIP and highway fund
sanctions must contend with a critical point that distinguishes
the CAA crossover condition from the invalidated Medicaid
expansion condition. In contrast to the ACA, the CAA provides
states with the straightforward option to avoid all SIP-related
obligations and sanctions by simply opting out of the SIP
program and invoking the federal FIP alternative.227 After all,
223. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7477 (2013) (prohibiting construction of a “major
emitting facility” without a permit that requires the proposed facility use “the best
available control technology” for each pollutant subject to regulation under the
Act, regardless of applicable SIP provisions).
224. Lawrence Hurley, Texas Wastes No Time in Citing Supreme Court Health
Care Ruling in Clean Air Act Litigation, ENV’T & ENERGY PUBL’G (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/08/01/1.
225. D.C. Circuit Calendar, available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/
sixtyday.nsf/fullcalendar?OpenView&term=2013&count=1000&date=2013-06-27;
email from Professor Richard Lazarus, Harvard Law School (June 27, 2013)
(discussing oral arguments).
226. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
227. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Texas Unconvincing in Clean Air Suit, ENVTL.
FORUM, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 12, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rlazarus/
docs/columns/LAZARUS_FORUM_2012_SEP-OCT.pdf; Damien M. Schiff, NFIB
v. Sebelius, Coercion, and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
SCOTUSREPORT (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/08/06/nfib-vsebelius-coercion-and-the-unconstitutional-conditions-doctrine/; David Baake,
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the premise of the Sebelius doctrine is that Congress should not
be able to coerce the states, and enabling the states to opt out
without losing the funds at issue is the antithesis of Sebelius
coercion.
Consider how the facts of a pure SIP highway fund
challenge would differ from those at issue in Sebelius. States
that opted out of their role in administering the Medicaid
expansion stood to lose all of their existing Medicaid funding,
facing an all-or-nothing dilemma regarding participation in
both federal programs. Their choices were to either accept the
new expansion, or lose all federal funding under the existing
program. By contrast, the CAA enables states to avoid SIP
obligations without sacrificing the existing highway fund
partnership by opting for the EPA to directly regulate in-state
polluters through a FIP.228 In that case, the EPA becomes the
author and implementer of plans to regulate pollution in the
state, and sanctions against a state for noncompliance
disappear.229
The fact that most states prefer the autonomy conferred by
the SIP option over direct EPA regulation under the FIP
alternative is irrelevant to the Sebelius coercion inquiry. The
point is that states relying on recurring highway grants may
continue to receive them independently from any SIP
obligations by opting out of the SIP program entirely. If states
decide that they prefer the regulatory control that a SIP offers
over a FIP, that represents a freely bargained-for position that
does not implicate Sebelius coercion.
Even if the FIP alternative were not available to forestall
the highway fund penalty, CAA sanctions are distinguishable
from the troubled Medicaid penalty on several other grounds.
Most important, federal funding plays a much smaller role in
state transportation regulation than it does in state Medicaid
implementation.230 For example, in 2010, federal funding
comprised 42 percent of all state expenditures on Medicaid, but

Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway” Provision
Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1,
6–7 (2012), http://www3.law.harvard.edu/journals/elr/2012/10/17/federalism-inthe-air-is-the-clean-air-acts-my-way-or-no-highway-provision-constitutional-afternfib-v-sebelius/.
228. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 116, 212 and accompanying text.
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only 7.3 percent of all state transportation funding.231 A court
reviewing a Sebelius challenge to the highway fund sanctions
could easily conclude that the funds at issue are so much
smaller in size and impact than Medicaid funding that the CAA
sanctions are just too small to meet the size-related coercion
factor. That said, the vagueness of the size constraint means
that a court could also find it violated here, highlighting the
wide zone of uncertainty that the Chief Justice left open
between Dole and Sebelius.
As noted, however, the CAA provides the EPA with a
variety of ways to forestall or lighten the penalty in comparison
to the all-or-nothing approach of the ACA’s Medicaid penalty,
rendering the overall force of the penalty less “coercive” in
impact. The vulnerable federal highway grants are much more
narrowly tailored than those at issue in Sebelius, exempting
essential highway funds devoted to road-safety and other
protected projects. The EPA also retains much greater
discretion on when and how to apply them. Unless an entire
state is out of compliance (which would be unprecedented),
highway funds may be withheld proportionately, corresponding
only to the portion of the state in non-attainment.232 The
administrator also retains discretion not to apply the penalty if
the state is making good-faith efforts to comply,233 an option
that the Court apparently considered unavailable to Secretary
Sebelius regarding Medicaid sanctions.
Finally, to the extent Sebelius was decided to protect
legitimate state expectations in spending-power bargaining,
the reliance interests at stake are much different in the CAA
context. Participating states have consented to the CAA’s
crossover terms for decades, in contrast with the open rebellion
that took place in the wake of the ACA’s passage. If any state
reliance interests were upset by unfair surprise when the
sanctions first emerged, that upset may have become mooted
by subsequent state expectations generated through years of
experience under the existing program. If the program were

231. NASBO FY 2010 Report, supra note 118, at 9–10 (describing sources of
state funds by expenditure category and federal fund expenditures).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A) (2013) (“Administrator may impose a
prohibition, applicable to a nonattainment area, on the approval by the Secretary
of Transportation of any projects or the awarding by the Secretary of any grants.”
(emphasis added)).
233. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7509(a) (2013).
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later amended in some meaningful way, however, this defense
could be weakened.
With all this in mind, a successful facial challenge seems
extremely unlikely, because it is difficult to imagine the law
proving coercive in every possible application.234 The worst
case scenario for the CAA is more likely that an individual
state could succeed on a more limited, as-applied challenge if
the federal alternative is somehow disregarded and none of
EPA’s ample discretion is deployed in that state’s favor.235 That
would leave the overall statutory program intact, providing
relief only to the state demonstrating coercion in a particular
instance.
Of course, even the threat of a successful as-applied
challenge may be enough to prompt the EPA to enforce
sanctions more mildly, which in turn could weaken the rigor
with which states comply. In this way, Sebelius could
meaningfully impact the way the CAA functions, even if it does
not undo the current terms of the statute. Given the fact that
the EPA has only enforced the sanctions one time in the history
of the statute,236 one might argue that even that kind of change
would be modest—but the fact that EPA has infrequently
enforced the sanctions could just as easily suggest that the
threat of enforcement alone was effective. If the threat of
Sebelius litigation served to undermine the overall culture of
enforcement within the statutory partnership, it could prove
devastating to the goals of the CAA.
One final point of legal analysis warrants mention here. If
the CAA were challenged for exceeding the new Sebelius limit,
it would be tempting to argue that even if the sanction did
somehow violate the new spending-power limit, its terms are
independently authorized under the Commerce Clause.237
234. In a facial challenge, the plaintiff argues that the law is unconstitutional
“on its face,” meaning that the law cannot be applied constitutionally in any
circumstance. An as-applied challenge argues that the law functions
unconstitutionally in a specified circumstance, even if it may be constitutionally
applied in other circumstances. The latter is much easier to prove, but its
individualized remedy is less satisfying because the overall law remains intact.
235. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 87, at 920 (“[I]f the Administrator were to shut
off all federal highway funds to a state based on the state’s failure to provide a
sufficient response to stationary sources of pollution, her actions would raise
serious questions under the Chief Justice’s opinion.”).
236. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
237. For example, the Fourth Circuit upheld the CAA against a federalism
challenge in Virginia v. Browner in 1996, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996), holding
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Sebelius doesn’t alter Congress’s settled commerce authority to
regulate air pollution, but it is important to note that
challenges to the highway fund sanctions focus on an
independent issue.
Even if Congress can regulate polluters directly under the
Commerce Clause, there is a separate constitutional question
about whether Congress can secure state participation in
implementing the CAA. Here, the issue is whether the federal
government is impermissibly compelling state implementation
of the Clean Air Act, a federal regulatory program, in violation
of the Tenth Amendment. In cases like Sweat v. Hull238 and
Missouri v. United States,239 challengers argued that the threat
of sanctions unconstitutionally coerced the states to participate
in the federal program, in violation of the Tenth Amendment
anti-commandeering doctrine.240 Notably, these suits failed.
However, the Sebelius decision alters some of this
precedent.241 These earlier decisions grounded the overall CAA
in commerce authority but relied explicitly on the consent
theory of the spending power to immunize the highway
sanctions against coercion claims. Thanks to the crossover
characteristics of the sanctions, the spending-power basis of
these decisions could have less force after Sebelius.
Still, the change will most likely prove a distinction
without a difference. Even without the old spending-power
precedent, coercion claims should be easily refuted by the lack
of coercion in fact, given the distinguishable nature of the CAA
sanctions and the fact that states can avoid the risk of
sanctions entirely by opting for direct EPA regulation from a
FIP. Even the landmark New Federalism anti-commandeering
decision, New York v. United States, affirmed that the Tenth
that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “activities causing air
or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more
than one State” (internal quotations omitted). At least one federal court has gone
as far as to hold that air pollution is itself interstate commerce. United States v.
Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968).
238. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Ariz. 2001) (rejecting Tenth Amendment defense
of state’s unilateral decision to terminate pollution controls provided for in State
Implementation Plan under Clean Air Act).
239. 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge
to Clean Air Act requirements for State Implementation Plans).
240. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
241. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 15, at 833 (discussing how Sebelius altered
the anti-commandeering doctrine and the implication this may have on federal
regulation of state and local taxation).
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Amendment is satisfied when Congress presents the states
with a choice of at least one constitutional alternative.242
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AFTER SEBELIUS: CHANGING
THE DYNAMICS OF STATE-FEDERAL BARGAINING
The CAA thus has good chances in court, but of course,
that is not the end of Sebelius’s impact. In environmental law
and elsewhere, Sebelius will be felt not in the outcomes of
litigation but in the changed dynamics of state-federal
bargaining. In the context of interjurisdictional governance,
statutes and litigation frame the outer boundaries of a working
relationship that is more wholly comprised of negotiation,
consultation, and competition.243 It is within this fabric of
state-federal exchange that the most federalism-sensitive
governance takes place,244 and this is where Sebelius takes
aim. This Part briefly considers how Sebelius may change the
dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining between state and
federal actors.
On the surface, the doctrine is designed to favor states’
interests over federal interests, and at least on the surface of
state-federal relations, it will do so. As a result of Sebelius, the
states will have more leverage when negotiating the future
terms of spending-power bargains and enforcement. This is
“Negotiation 101”: the better a state’s chances in court, or the
costlier it will be for the agency to determine the legal limit,
the stronger the state’s bargaining position becomes at the
table. Even setting aside the costs of litigation at a time of
strained budgets, a risk-averse agency may shy away from
enforcing even defensible terms just to avoid the fallout from
federalism lawsuits that can easily become political lightning
rods.
Indeed, we have learned from previous environmental
federalism controversies that the threat of litigation—even
litigation that is unlikely to be successful—can profoundly
change the way that the implementing federal agencies behave,
especially when the Court’s ruling creates considerable
242. New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (1992).
243. See generally Ryan, supra note 18; RYAN, supra note 7, at 265–314 (both
discussing negotiated federalism as a general enterprise of interjurisdictional
governance).
244. Id.
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uncertainty. For example, after two Supreme Court decisions
clouded the extent of federal Clean Water Act authority to
regulate wetlands, the federal agencies substantially pulled
back from enforcement efforts in realms of regulatory
uncertainty.245 An investigation in 2010 reported that nearly
1,500 major water pollution investigations had been dropped
due to the difficulty of establishing jurisdiction after these
decisions.246
As a result of this shift in leverage, Congress will be more
cautious in drafting laws that create spending-power
partnerships, and agencies will be more hesitant in
implementing them. Indeed, the EPA may capitulate more
easily in negotiating compliance under the CAA, and it will
certainly be less likely to press for the kinds of penalties that
could prompt a Sebelius challenge. Of course, the EPA could
also seek closure by isolating a test case and using it to
establish clearer limits—but it is unlikely to do so before the
current Court, which came so close in Sebelius to limiting the
commerce authority on which so many environmental laws are
premised. In addition, states may continue the trend of
negotiating towards individualized waivers from more
generally applicable laws, and the EPA may be more receptive.
Federal lawmaking may also shift after Sebelius.
Assuming it withstands Sebelius scrutiny as I suggest above,
the “FIP Model” of conditional preemption—allowing states the
choice between direct federal regulation and state
implementation of federal goals—is likely to become a fixture
in spending-power partnerships far beyond environmental law.
Indeed, one scholar intimate with the development of the ACA
suggests that if the drafters could do it again, they would likely
have structured some sort of federal fallback provision (like the
FIP alternative) into the Medicaid expansion.247 The FIP model

245. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006); Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001).
246. Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act,
Foiling EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/
us/01water.html?emc=eta.
247. Professor Sara Rosenbaum, email correspondence of April 7, 2014 (on file
with author); see also Sara Rosenbaum, Open Exchanges to the Poor in States that
Opt Out of Medicaid, ROLL CALL (July 26, 2013), available at
http://www.rollcall.com/news/open_exchanges_to_the_poor_in_states_that_opt_out
_of_medicaid_commentary-226677-1.html. Professor Rosenbaum teaches at the
Milken Institute School of Public Health at George Washington University.
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will protect the core constitutional concern of the Sebelius
doctrine, which is to preserve genuine state choice (although,
as in the case of the CAA, some states may well dislike both
alternatives).
Another feature for export from the Clean Air Act may be
its model of carefully tailored, proportional sanctions, which
may prove more resilient against challenges of coercion. In
certain governance contexts, especially those prone to the
pronounced geographical diversity that environmental
management often confronts, proportional sanctions are a more
equitable alternative to the all-or-nothing alternative of the
Medicaid model. Indeed, even the ACA would have benefited
from more formal statutory recognition for the informal
sanctioning discretion that some experts claim the Secretary
had all along.248 However, proportional sanctions may reduce
the overall force of sanctioning threats, which could complicate
interjurisdictional governance where national uniformity
rightly takes precedence over local diversity.249
Nevertheless, although the Sebelius doctrine is designed to
advance state interests, the resulting changes in state-federal
dynamics could also harm the interests of states. Fear of
liability and uncertainty may prompt Congress to reduce or
avoid state-federal partnerships in regulatory arenas where
states might prefer them.250 Congress may lean toward smaller
federal grants in cooperative programs of more limited
duration, or toward programs that bypass the states entirely to
avoid Sebelius impacts.251 Sebelius is intended to enhance the
248. Interview with Professor Barbara Safriet, Portland, OR (Oct. 22, 2013).
Professor Safriet was the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Lecturer in
Health Law at Yale Law School, and she currently teaches at Lewis & Clark Law
School.
249. Ryan, supra note 18, at 66–69 (discussing the advantages of local diversity
and national uniformity in market-related regulatory contexts of motor vehicle
emissions and carbon markets).
250. Cf. Metzger, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing that Sebelius “may carry the
seeds of its own irrelevance. By cabining money and potentially making it less
effective as a regulatory tool, NFIB may encourage a return to centralized
programs and direct regulatory approaches, or—more likely—a switch to more
discretionary financial incentives. Such a move to greater discretion is already
well afoot in many cooperative-federalism contexts. The net result may well be a
change in the form of federal measures, but little restriction on the scope of
federal power.”).
251. See Pasachoff, supra note 135, at 651 (concluding that Sebelius is unlikely
to impact federal education grants no matter how large they are, but that it is still
likely to affect the future of federal education law by changing the architecture of
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power of states negotiating with a formidable federal partner,
but this new leverage is only meaningful to the extent the
federal government remains at the bargaining table.
Justice Ginsburg flagged exactly this problem in her
dissent, where she worried that the combined effect of these
impacts could perversely act to limit state influence in
interjurisdictional governance.252 She warned that “[t]he
alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears emphasis,
is not state autonomy but state marginalization,”253 and
contrasted the history of the Medicaid spending partnership
with the fully federal Medicare program:
In 1965, Congress elected to nationalize health coverage for
seniors through Medicare. It could similarly have
established Medicaid as an exclusively federal program.
Instead, Congress gave the States the opportunity to
partner in the program’s administration and development.
Absent from the nationalized model, of course, is the statelevel policy discretion and experimentation that is
Medicaid’s hallmark; undoubtedly the interests of
federalism are better served when States retain a
meaningful role in the implementation of a program of such
importance.254

Indeed, the reason that all but a handful of states elect to
design air quality state implementation plans under the Clean
Air Act and approve water pollution discharge permits under
the Clean Water Act is that they prefer the resulting autonomy
and engagement to direct federal regulation by the EPA. The
Sebelius anti-coercion doctrine is all about preserving state
choice, but sometimes the state’s best choice is an
intergovernmental partnership. After all this, it would be a
great shame (and an even greater irony) if a doctrine intended
to foster state autonomy inadvertently acted to undermine it.
Moreover, Sebelius could harm both state and federal
interests by making it more difficult for the federal government

state-federal partnerships).
252. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text (discussing this argument
in her dissent).
253. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2632–33 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
254. Id.
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to make adjustments to existing spending partnerships. If
federal actors fear the uncertain point at which statutory
amendments create independent obligations and crossover
conditions, fewer changes will be made—even positive changes
that might assist the ultimate beneficiaries of regulation, the
American public. For example, Congress will (hopefully) learn
from its experiences in the early years of the expanded
Medicaid program. But as discussed earlier, will the threat of
ongoing litigation—and perhaps the requirement of a third
track of a state-elected Medicaid option—blunt the enthusiasm
of lawmakers and agency personnel to adopt responsive
reforms?255
Finally, the doctrine could also inhibit the kinds of
integrative creativity in intergovernmental bargaining that
accrues to the benefit of all parties.256 As one former state
attorney explained, the state attorney general’s office often
advised the legislature that the state’s interests in
interjurisdictional governance are best served by maintaining
maximum flexibility in both directions, preserving the largest
possible scope of state-federal bargaining.257 As he noted,
limiting federal discretion out of ideological opposition to
federal power does not necessarily correspond to more
beneficial outcomes for the state.258
Win-win solutions often require that both sides be enabled
to bargain freely with many sources of trade, including not only
tangible resources like funding, technical expertise, and other
forms of governance capacity, but also intangible resources
such as regulatory authority, permissions, political credit, and
normative principles.259 Because the Sebelius doctrine limits

255. See supra text following note 132 (discussing the possibility of multiple
Medicaid tracks).
256. See generally Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, & Dealing: The Problems and
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337 (2002)
(analyzing the theoretical disconnect between the Supreme Court’s antibargaining takings jurisprudence and the potential for integrative bargaining in
land use planning).
257. Interview with Professor H. Jefferson Powell, former special counsel to
the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, New York, NY (Mar. 14,
2014). Professor Powell has served in a variety of state and federal positions over
the years, most recently as deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of legal
Counsel at the United States Department of Justice.
258. Id.
259. See RYAN, supra note 7, 326–38 (discussing the various sources of trade in
state-federal negotiations), 356–67 (discussing expanded possibilities for
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the permissible scope of state-federal bargaining in new and
uncertain ways, it has the potential to hamper the creativity
and flexibility of all parties in ways that could prevent statefederal bargaining from reaching the Pareto frontier.
CONCLUSION
This, then, is what environmental law looks like after
Sebelius—and indeed, how much regulatory law is likely to
appear. The foregoing analysis teases apart the elements of the
new spending-power limit and applies it to a body of law with
many spending-power partnerships, in order to explore its
impact on cooperative federalism more generally. The analysis
is useful both to understand the prospects of environmental
federalism as we know it, and to explore how the new doctrine
will interact with state-federal partnerships in all areas of law.
After Sebelius, programs of cooperative federalism may
exceed the spending power when (1) the new offer changes the
terms of an entrenched partnership, (2) the new offer
conditions existing funds on compliance with indirectly related
terms, and (3) the size of the grant at issue is so large that the
state could not forgo it without excessive economic harm.
In environmental law, only the CAA potentially triggers all
three elements, and it is distinguishable from the Medicaid
example because states can avoid the penalty entirely by
allowing EPA to regulate in-state polluters directly. The size of
the implicated funds is also much smaller than those held
coercive in Sebelius, and the CAA provides substantial
discretion to the agency to avoid the all-or-nothing coerciveness
that the Court disparaged in Sebelius. The fact that the
program has been in operation for so long may also mitigate
the frustration of states’ reliance interests that drove the
plurality’s analysis of the ACA Medicaid expansion.
Nevertheless, the impacts of the doctrine may extend far
beyond the courtroom. As the post-SWANNC/Rapanos wetland
cases demonstrate, the threat of even uncertain litigation can
seriously alter the norms of statutory implementation. The
Sebelius doctrine will change the dynamics of state-federal
bargaining within programs of cooperative federalism in ways

integrative bargaining in state-federal negotiations); see also Ryan, supra note 18,
at 86–101, 121–34 (same).

RYAN_AUTHORRETURN

2014]

5/31/2014 2:28 PM

SPENDING POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1065

that may surprise its architects. Some changes may favor state
interests, increasing their leverage at the negotiating table and
reducing the threat of sanctions for regulatory noncompliance.
Others may redound to their detriment, prompting federal
lawmakers to circumscribe spending-power partnerships in
ways that marginalize state influence, or avoid state-federal
partnerships altogether.
Meanwhile, and despite its substantial flaws, the Sebelius
decision exposes a problem in spending-power bargaining that
fairly warrants our attention: that is, how the analysis shifts
when the states are not opting in or out of a cooperativefederalism program from scratch, but after having developed
substantial infrastructure around a long-term partnership.
The states, like people, sometimes have to make
uncomfortable choices between undesirable alternatives, and
this alone should not undermine genuine consent. But
admittedly, most of us build the infrastructure of our lives
around agreements that will (hopefully) last longer than one
fiscal year. The Chief Justice’s analysis should provoke at least
a little sympathy for the occasionally vulnerable position of
states that have seriously invested in an ongoing federal
partnership that suddenly changes.260 (Indeed, those
sympathetic to the ACA but frustrated with No Child Left
Behind’s impositions on dissenting states should consider how
to distinguish them.)261
260. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
941, 946 (2013) (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts’ decision represented a
rough “effort to think about how to regulate the ongoing, iterative relationship
between the States and the federal government when they partner.”). As
Professor Gerken writes, “[t]he Chief Justice wanted to ensure that the principal
cannot pull the rug out from under the agent, even when the agent rebels. It may
not be the right way to think about cooperative and uncooperative federalism, but
it is an effort to think about it.” Id. See also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda
for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 434 (2013) (suggesting
further exploration of “whether (and when) uncooperative federalism is
normatively attractive,” “how uncooperative federalism actually works under
particular statutory schemes and how constitutional doctrine might enhance it,”
and “underlying motivational questions about why state officials would want to
engage in uncooperative dissenting behavior”).
261. See, e.g., Sierra Fisher, Compulsory Accountability Renders the No Child
Left Behind Act Unconstitutional: The Texas Education Agency’s Ultimate Tool to
Ensure Its Waiver from the Department of Education, 14 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L. J.
467, 480–81 (2013) (discussing how the Texas Education Agency may be
successful in challenging the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) as
unconstitutionally coercive because NCLB is a major alteration to a longstanding
governmental program and Congress passed NCLB as a conditional spending
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It is important to take bargaining consent seriously,
because an awful lot of American governance really is
negotiated between state and federal actors.262 Supplanting
appropriately legislative judgment with incoherent judicial
rules seems like the wrong response, but perhaps the political
branches can do more to address the problem. For example, to
avoid coerced consent after amending an ongoing program,
Congress could provide states a phase-out period to ramp down
from a previous partnership without having to simultaneously
ramp up to new requirements—effectively creating a COBRA
policy for states voluntarily leaving a partnership.263 This
would create additional administrative challenges, but surely it
would be preferable to the thicket of confusion Sebelius creates
by allowing judicial declarations of new legislative programs
for the express purpose of judicial federalism review.
While the new doctrine thus legitimately focuses our
attention on matters of fairness in state-federal bargaining, it
is not yet clear whether it will accomplish its greater goal. In
the end, the great project of American federalism is to inform
interjurisdictional governance with the appropriate balance of
local and national perspectives, expertise, and values.264 At the
moment, it is hard to see how far Sebelius will advance that
project; only time will tell. In the meanwhile, we can at least
hope that it won’t hold us back.

program).
262. RYAN, supra note 7, 265–367; see also, Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); Gerken, supra note 260, at 946 (“But when the
policymaking gods close a door, they sometimes open a window. Here, the
policymaking gods have guaranteed that state officials will play a crucial role in
administering a crucial federal law. They will be able to provide a source of
dissent, resistance, and change for a national program that’s going to matter a
great deal to a great many people.”).
263. Cf. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (enabling employees a limited period in
which to continue existing health insurance coverage after leaving employment).
264. See RYAN, supra note 7, xi–xxix

